Paul Kagame: “We refuse to remove defensive measures"

Paul Kagame Refuses to Implement the Washington Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 2773: Analysis and Implications

In an exclusive interview published on 3 April 2026, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda openly confirmed that Rwandan forces are deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, rejected calls for their withdrawal, dismissed US sanctions as illegitimate, and signalled clear satisfaction with the current military status quo. This briefing examines what Kagame said, what his remarks mean for the Washington Accords, and what concrete steps the United States must now take if it wishes to restore credibility to its diplomacy in the Great Lakes region.

Introduction: A Confession Wrapped in Grievance

The interview, conducted by François Soudan and published in Jeune Afrique on 3 April 2026, is one of the most candid public statements Paul Kagame has made on Rwanda's military role in the DRC. Its significance does not lie in revealing something previously unknown. The presence of the Rwanda Defence Force in eastern Congo has already been documented in successive UN Group of Experts reports. What makes this interview important is that it removes the last remaining space for diplomatic ambiguity. Kagame did not merely hint at Rwanda's involvement. He confirmed it, justified it, and refused to end it.

For the United States, which brokered the Washington Accords in December 2024 and later imposed sanctions on the RDF and four of its senior commanders, the interview amounts to a direct political challenge. Kagame has effectively told Washington that its diplomacy is one-sided, its sanctions lack legitimacy, and Rwanda will not withdraw from eastern Congo unless conditions defined by Kigali itself are first met. The central question for the United States is therefore no longer whether Rwanda is complying. It is what Washington intends to do in response to open defiance.

Kagame's Own Words: On Withdrawal

"We refuse to remove defensive measures. Whether it means troops or troops and whatever else, we call it defensive measures. And in your logic, why would a threat be against me? And you are asking me to remove my defensive measures, but you're not dealing with the threat. What is the logic?"

What Kagame Actually Said: The Key Admissions

The interview contains several statements that are individually striking and, taken together, amount to a broad rejection of both the Washington framework and UN Security Council Resolution 2773. Each deserves close examination.

Admission One: Rwandan Troops Are on the Ground

When asked whether Rwanda's so-called "defensive measures" included a physical presence in eastern Congo, Kagame answered without equivocation. He stated that such measures may involve equipment and troops on the ground to defend Rwandan territory, and that moving five, ten, or even twenty kilometres across the border in pursuit of a threat was, in his view, not contradictory. Rwanda's ambassador in Washington had already told the US administration on 22 January 2025 that Rwanda engages in "security coordination with RDF/M23". In this interview, Kagame went further. He confirmed that troops, equipment, and territorial penetration all fall within Rwanda's definition of "defensive measures".

This matters all the more because only two months earlier, on 3 February 2025, Kagame told CNN's Larry Madowo that he did not know whether Rwandan troops were inside the DRC, despite being commander-in-chief of the RDF. Pressed repeatedly, he declined to confirm or deny their presence, saying only that Rwanda would do "anything to protect itself" and telling the journalist to "read whatever you want to read from what I'm telling you". The contrast between that ambiguity and his open confirmation in the Jeune Afrique interview is not a matter of changing circumstances. It is evidence of deliberate political deception. A head of state who also serves as supreme commander of the armed forces does not fail to know whether his troops are deployed in a neighbouring country. He decides what to say, and when to say it, according to the political cost of telling the truth.

Kagame's Own Words: On Troops

"It means you may use equipment. You may use troops on the ground, which means to defend that territory... If I'm defending my border one morning, I mean five kilometres or ten or twenty because of what I identified as a threat — what is the contradiction?"

Admission Two: Rwanda Is Comfortable With the M23-Controlled Zone

Kagame was asked whether Rwanda's strategic objective in eastern Congo was to maintain a zone of political, economic and security influence until an agreement could be reached with a Congolese government it did not regard as hostile. His answer was careful, but unmistakable. He said that the zone controlled by RDF/M23 was "not an immediate danger" to Rwanda and that Rwanda was, to some extent, "comfortable" with the current situation, while acknowledging that it was not the final stage.

This is a decisive admission. It means Rwanda has no meaningful strategic incentive to implement the Washington Accords or Resolution 2773 unless and until it secures political guarantees from Kinshasa on terms acceptable to Kigali. For Rwanda, the ceasefire and withdrawal provisions are not obligations to be honoured. They are bargaining tools to be used.

Admission Three: The Uvira Argument Reveals Bad Faith

Among the arguments Kagame advanced in the interview, his account of the fall of Uvira is especially revealing. He argued that fighting around Uvira had already been ongoing for weeks before the signing of the Washington Accords on 4 December 2024, that the United States had been informed almost daily, and that subsequent American outrage was therefore selective and misleading.

This claim is intended to sound reasonable. In fact, it is self-defeating. Kagame's argument is essentially this: because fighting was already under way before the signing, the subsequent fall of Uvira cannot be treated as evidence of Rwandan bad faith. Yet that reasoning collapses the moment it is examined. If fighting was indeed already ongoing, and Rwanda knew it, then Rwanda signed the Washington Accords while its allied forces were already advancing on Uvira and without any intention of stopping them. That is not good-faith peace diplomacy. It is the use of diplomatic ceremony as cover for a military operation already in progress.

A state acting in good faith at the signing of a peace agreement freezes military operations at the moment the agreement takes effect. It does not allow them to continue until the tactical objective is achieved. Even if one accepts Kagame's account in full, Rwanda had every opportunity either to halt the advance before the signing, delay the signing until operations had stopped, or sign with explicit reservations and a clear timetable for military suspension. None of those things happened. Rwanda signed, the advance continued, the fighting intensified, and Uvira fell.

Kagame's own argument therefore proves the opposite of what he intends. By asserting that the fighting predated the signing and that Washington knew this, he is confirming that Rwanda signed the Accords while knowingly allowing its allied forces to continue an active offensive. That is not interpretation. It is the clearest possible evidence of bad faith.

The Inescapable Logic

Kagame's position, stripped to its essentials, is that fighting which began before the Accords were signed was somehow not covered by the Accords and could continue uninterrupted after the signing. This is not a plausible reading of a peace agreement. It is the deliberate negation of one.

There is also a further point that deserves to be stated plainly. Even if military momentum made an immediate halt difficult, the proper course for any party genuinely committed to peace would have been to communicate that difficulty honestly to the mediating state, seek a brief postponement, or agree a clear and verifiable mechanism for freezing the front line. Rwanda did none of these things. It signed, advanced, captured territory, and only later defended its conduct by invoking context. That is the posture of a party that never intended to comply.

This logic is also consistent with Rwanda's broader diplomatic record over the last three decades. Agreements are signed when they provide political cover or tactical advantage. They are ignored, delayed or emptied of substance when they threaten to constrain strategic objectives.

Admission Four: The FDLR Is Being Used as a Condition, Not a Concern

Throughout the interview, Kagame repeatedly returned to the FDLR as the justification for Rwanda's military role in eastern Congo. He insisted that Rwanda cannot be asked to withdraw until the FDLR threat is eliminated. Yet the FDLR has served as Rwanda's standing justification for intervention in the DRC since 1996. Over that time, the group's actual military capacity has been significantly degraded through repeated operations involving both the Congolese army and past Rwandan interventions. At the same time, the UN Mapping Report of 2010 documented mass atrocities committed by Rwandan forces in eastern Congo during operations purportedly directed against the FDLR.

The FDLR argument is therefore not best understood as a narrowly defined security assessment. It functions as a permanent and expandable condition. Because the group's continued existence, even in diminished form, can always be invoked, it provides Kigali with an open-ended justification for military intervention on Congolese territory.

There is also a deeper historical dimension that Rwanda's official security narrative routinely excludes. The FDLR has long claimed that part of its continuing existence is linked to the protection of Hutu refugees who were repeatedly targeted and massacred in operations carried out by Rwandan and Congolese forces over several decades. The UN Mapping Report documented those massacres in considerable detail. That does not legitimise the FDLR, but it does complicate the simplistic narrative through which Kigali presents the group as a timeless and self-explanatory threat.

Kagame's Own Words: On Sanctions

"You don't have to have done anything wrong. But because they are in support of somebody who has done something wrong, who is doing something wrong, they apply it. If it is based on interest and they don't have interest in me, how am I going to stop that?"

The Washington Accords: What Was Agreed and What Has Collapsed

The Washington Accords of 4 December 2024, brokered by the United States after months of shuttle diplomacy, required both Rwanda and the DRC to take concrete steps towards de-escalation. Rwanda was expected to cease support for RDF/M23, facilitate the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory, and participate in a monitoring mechanism. The DRC was required to address Rwanda's stated security concerns, including armed groups operating near the border.

Within days of the signing, RDF/M23 forces coordinated by the RDF seized Uvira, a major commercial centre in South Kivu. By January 2025, Goma and Bukavu had fallen. In practical terms, the Accords collapsed almost immediately. The US Treasury's designation of the RDF and four senior commanders in March 2025, including General James Kabarebe, was an acknowledgement that Rwanda had not complied and showed no serious intention of doing so.

Kagame's response to the question of immediate withdrawal was revealing not because he directly refused, but because he substituted a procedural argument for a legal one. He argued that all parties have obligations, that the DRC has failed to honour previous agreements, and that pressure must be applied evenly. Yet this framing deliberately obscures the central asymmetry. The DRC is not occupying Rwandan territory. Rwanda is occupying Congolese territory. That distinction is not secondary. It is the central legal and moral fact of the conflict. Under any serious interpretation of the Accords, the occupying party is the party that must withdraw.

A Thirty-Year Pattern: Signing Agreements Without Intending to Honour Them

Kagame's refusal to implement the Washington Accords is not an isolated incident. It belongs to a longer pattern stretching back to the earliest phase of his political and military rise. The core problem is not that peace agreements have been poorly designed. It is that Rwanda's leadership has repeatedly treated agreements as tactical instruments rather than binding commitments whenever implementation would constrain its strategic objectives.

The Arusha Peace Accords of 4 August 1993 between the government of President Juvénal Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front provided for a transitional government, power sharing, military integration, refugee return, and the creation of democratic institutions. They were internationally celebrated. They were never implemented. On 6 April 1994, the aircraft carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down as it approached Kigali. Both presidents were killed. The genocide followed within hours. The destruction of the Arusha framework was not incidental to what came next. It was its political precondition.

French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière concluded in 2006, after a lengthy investigation, that the attack was carried out by the RPF on Kagame's orders and issued arrest warrants for senior RPF commanders. Spanish judge Fernando Andreu Merelles reached similar conclusions in 2008 and indicted forty RPF officers. Rwanda has consistently denied these conclusions, while suppressing domestic discussion of the issue.

For present purposes, the broader significance is clear. Arusha would have constrained the RPF's route to exclusive state power. It failed in circumstances that, according to these investigations, were not accidental. The pattern remains familiar: agreements are signed when they serve tactical interests; they are made impossible when they threaten strategic ones.

The Historical Parallel

In 1993, the RPF signed the Arusha Accords with the Habyarimana government. They were never implemented. In December 2024, Rwanda signed the Washington Accords with the Tshisekedi government. Within days, RDF/M23 seized Uvira. On 3 April 2026, Kagame declared himself comfortable with the status quo. The interval is thirty years. The political logic is the same.

The Luanda Process: Participation Without Accountability

The Luanda process, facilitated by Angola under President João Lourenço, has been the main African diplomatic framework for the DRC-Rwanda conflict since 2022. It has produced communiqués, principles and roadmaps, but no lasting ceasefire, no verified withdrawal, and no functioning compliance mechanism. Rwanda's conduct has been central to that failure.

Most tellingly, Kagame refused to attend the signing of the Luanda peace deal in person, even as President Tshisekedi did. His stated reason was that Tshisekedi should first negotiate directly with M23 before any presidential-level meeting could occur. That position is circular by design. It makes direct presidential engagement conditional on the DRC first legitimising an armed group that Rwanda itself created and supports.

This is more than a diplomatic inconvenience. It is a method. Rwanda gains the political benefit of appearing engaged in a peace process while avoiding the full accountability that direct participation creates. Tshisekedi's presence generated measurable commitments for the DRC. Kagame's absence created flexibility for Rwanda. That asymmetry has been one of the most consistent features of Rwandan diplomatic practice.

A Consistent Strategic Logic

Across Arusha in 1993, Lusaka in 1999, Sun City in 2002, the Nairobi Communiqué in 2013, the Nairobi Process in 2022, and the Washington Accords in 2024, the same strategic logic appears. Rwanda engages in diplomacy when engagement confers political legitimacy, delays pressure, or creates a framework through which it can later blame the DRC. It delays, obstructs or directly violates implementation when compliance would require it to give up military or territorial advantages it values.

The international community's repeated refusal to name this pattern explicitly has itself become a political choice. Each broken agreement has been treated as an isolated procedural failure rather than as evidence of a settled governing method. The Jeune Afrique interview should mark the point at which that indulgence ends.

The Minerals Dimension: Economic Interest and Strategic Calculation

Kagame also addressed the accusation that Rwanda's objectives in eastern DRC include control over mineral resources. He did so without apology. He acknowledged that Rwanda has become a regional financial and mineral-processing hub, that both Rwandan minerals and those coming from "outside" are welcome, and that Rwanda is able to certify their origin.

This framing requires close scrutiny. Successive UN Group of Experts reports have documented that coltan, gold, cassiterite and wolframite extracted from mines in North and South Kivu, in areas under RDF/M23 control or influence, are routed through Rwanda and exported under Rwandan certificates of origin. The commercial value of this trade is considerable. Rwanda's mineral exports have grown sharply since 2021, in inverse relation to security improvements in eastern Congo. This is not coincidental.

For Washington, the implication is clear. Rwanda's presence in eastern Congo is not driven only, or perhaps even primarily, by security logic. It is also sustained by a financial structure that benefits from continued control and instability. Any policy that focuses only on the FDLR while ignoring minerals will fail to grasp the full incentive structure of Rwanda's conduct.

Kabila, Proxy Governance and the Violation of International Law

Two of Kagame's statements in the interview amount to a public endorsement of conduct that cuts directly against the foundational principles of international law. The first concerns former DRC President Joseph Kabila's presence in Goma under RDF/M23 control. The second is Kagame's declaration that he would welcome anyone who wanted to confront the situation in the DRC and join the struggle for a stable Congo.

These are not casual remarks. They are policy statements. Kagame is effectively saying that Rwanda is willing to facilitate or support political and armed actors working against the internationally recognised government of the DRC.

Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states are prohibited from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, whether directly or indirectly. The International Court of Justice confirmed in DRC v. Uganda in 2005 that support to armed groups on the territory of another state without its consent violates international law. Rwanda's conduct, as documented in UN reports and now reinforced by Kagame's own statements, satisfies that standard. No invocation of the FDLR creates a lawful basis for long-term military occupation of Congolese territory.

Kagame's position is made more glaringly inconsistent by his complaints about Jean-Luc Habyarimana's alleged visit to Kinshasa. While publicly supporting Kabila's presence in M23-controlled territory and expressing openness to any actor confronting the Congolese government, Kigali objects to the DRC receiving a Rwandan opposition figure. That is not a defensible legal principle. It is an expression of double standards.

The Washington Accords included mutual commitments not to interfere in one another's internal affairs. Rwanda's conduct, as described by Kagame himself, violates that principle directly.

Rwanda's Armed Groups in the DRC: A Three-Decade Record

The current RDF/M23 formation is not a spontaneous insurgency. It is the latest version of a long series of armed structures created, financed, armed or directed by Rwanda in the DRC since 1996. These include the AFDL, the RCD, the CNDP, the M23, the current RDF/M23 structure, Red Tabara, and Twirwaneho in operational coordination with Rwandan-backed formations.

The pattern across these groups is consistent. Each is presented as a response to a specific threat. Each becomes an instrument of political influence, military control, resource extraction, or regional destabilisation. Each is denied by Kigali until the evidence becomes too strong, after which the structure is folded into a new process or reborn under a new name.

What exists now in eastern DRC is the most mature form of that architecture to date: a conventional military force, proxy armed structures, local militias framed through ethnic protection narratives, and cross-border destabilisation tools extending into neighbouring Burundi. Kagame's own words confirm that this is not a temporary reaction. It is a deliberate strategic system.

Kagame, Mozambique and the Limits of Rwanda's Leverage

Kagame also used the interview to issue a thinly veiled warning to the European Union regarding its support for Rwanda's deployment in Mozambique. Rwanda has deployed around 5,000 troops to Cabo Delgado since 2021 in support of security operations linked to major gas interests, including those of TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil. Kagame said that Rwanda spends four to five times the EU contribution and would simply withdraw if funding were cut.

This claim deserves scrutiny. The EU contribution was not invented arbitrarily. It would almost certainly have been based on figures and arrangements discussed with Kigali. Kagame's suggestion that Rwanda is generously subsidising the mission from its own modest means is therefore difficult to accept at face value. It is more plausible that the operation is underwritten through a broader set of financial arrangements involving the Mozambican state and corporate actors whose interests Rwanda is protecting.

For Washington, the relevance is straightforward. Rwanda's Mozambique deployment has often been cited as proof that Kigali is a responsible regional security actor. Yet if Kagame is prepared to treat that deployment as a financial bargaining chip, then its value as evidence of good faith collapses. A government that offers military security in exchange for money and threatens withdrawal when payment is disputed is acting less as a strategic partner than as a contractor.

The Victim-Perpetrator Inversion

Kagame repeatedly presented Rwanda as the victim of unfair international pressure, accusing critics of blaming the victim and praising the perpetrator. This rhetoric inverts the documented reality. Rwanda is not simply reacting to the DRC conflict. It is a central party to it.

The UN Group of Experts, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the US Treasury have all documented RDF support to M23 in troops, command, logistics and equipment. Kagame's interview reinforces that evidence.

The FDLR remains in existence, and some of its older members participated in the genocide. But when Kagame was asked directly about the group's current numbers, he could not provide them. A president claiming that the FDLR poses an existential threat sufficient to justify military operations in a neighbouring country should be able to define that threat with precision. His inability or unwillingness to do so suggests that the FDLR is being invoked politically rather than assessed operationally.

Meanwhile, the harm caused by RDF/M23 operations is visible, measurable and catastrophic: mass displacement, looting, sexual violence, forced recruitment, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and prolonged humanitarian collapse. Rwanda's chosen response is not only unlawful. It is also grossly disproportionate.

Kagame's Own Words: On the Status Quo

Kagame stated: "I am comfortable with the status quo. The zone controlled by RDF/M23 is not an immediate danger to us. So to some extent we are comfortable with that — but we know that that is not the end of the road."

This statement should be read exactly as it stands. Kagame is comfortable because the status quo serves Rwanda's strategic objectives. It enables military control, resource extraction, and the gradual installation of governance, taxation and security structures that replace Congolese state authority. This is not the language of temporary border defence. It is the language of strategic entrenchment and de facto annexation by other means.

What the United States and the United Nations Should Do

The interview makes one point unmistakably clear: Kagame does not fear the current level of pressure. Sanctions have been imposed. He dismisses them. Diplomatic statements have been issued. He rejects them. The Washington Accords were signed. He ignored them. The United States therefore faces a credibility crisis. If it does not respond in a coherent and more serious way, it will signal that agreements brokered by Washington can be broken at little cost.

A credible policy response should include full implementation of the March 2025 sanctions regime, targeted sanctions on Rwanda's mineral export chain, suspension of US security cooperation pending verifiable withdrawal, operational enforcement of Resolution 2773, a clear diplomatic pathway with defined benchmarks, visa restrictions on Rwanda's governing elite, sanctions on RPF-linked commercial structures including Crystal Ventures, and pursuit of an arms embargo pending full withdrawal.

One especially important gap concerns the FDLR. MONUSCO has never produced a formal, published and rigorous assessment of the actual level of threat the FDLR poses to Rwanda. This omission is politically significant because Rwanda has relied on the FDLR argument for three decades. MONUSCO has the mandate and capability to assess the group's strength, weaponry, border reach and operational significance. It should be directed to do so. Either the threat is genuine and can be addressed transparently, or it is being overstated and should be exposed as such. Continued ambiguity benefits only Rwanda.

Implications of Continued Inaction

If the United States fails to respond coherently, the consequences are predictable. Rwanda will continue to exploit and export Congolese minerals under Rwandan certification. It will deepen its parallel administration in eastern Congo. Human rights abuses will continue with limited documentation. Goma airport will remain under the control of RDF/M23, crippling humanitarian and economic access. Eastern Congo will remain paralysed. The DRC will have strong incentives to escalate militarily by whatever means it can. Impunity for atrocities will deepen. And the Congolese public will continue to question why Kinshasa signed the Washington Accords despite earlier insisting that no agreement would be signed before RDF withdrawal.

Sanctions Without Coherence: Why Washington Cannot Punish and Partner at the Same Time

There is a structural contradiction at the heart of current US policy. Washington has sanctioned the RDF and senior commanders, yet continues cooperation with Kigali in health, migration and mineral supply chains. That contradiction destroys the credibility of sanctions. A sanctions regime only works if it conveys that normal relations cannot continue while unlawful conduct persists. When adjacent sectors continue largely unchanged, the message received in Kigali is obvious: the sanctions are symbolic, not strategic.

The August 2025 migration agreement between the Trump administration and Rwanda was especially damaging in this regard. Concluded after sanctions and after major territorial seizures in eastern DRC, it signalled that Rwanda could openly defy US policy and still receive financial benefit through bilateral dealings.

The same incoherence exists in mineral policy. Western governments want critical minerals. Rwanda has positioned itself as a transit and processing hub. That creates internal resistance within Western systems to enforcing sanctions in any way that would disrupt supply chains. Kagame's confidence reflects his understanding of that contradiction.

The principle that should guide Washington is simple: a government whose armed forces are sanctioned for conduct in a neighbouring country cannot at the same time remain a preferred partner in migration, minerals and security cooperation.

Challenges and Competing Interests

Any serious analysis must acknowledge that Rwanda retains diplomatic advantages built over decades. The post-1994 Western alignment with Kigali was shaped partly by guilt over failure to stop the genocide and partly by the willingness of major powers to treat the RPF as a disciplined strategic ally. That relationship was never critically re-examined in proportion to the harm it enabled in the DRC.

A particularly important historical dimension concerns international justice. Former ICTR prosecutor Carla Del Ponte described political resistance to investigations into RPF crimes. That precedent of selective accountability helped entrench impunity. Rwanda also continues to benefit from a strong lobbying presence and from residual sympathy in some Western policy circles.

Regional complexity also matters. Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania all have interests in eastern Congo that are not identical to Rwanda's and not always aligned with Kinshasa either. Burundi in particular should have been more fully integrated into the Washington framework, given the threat posed to it by Red Tabara operating from Congolese territory with Rwandan links.

These are real complications. But they are arguments for strategic sophistication, not for passivity.

Future Trends and Outlook

The credibility of the United States as a peacemaker in Africa will not be judged by the number of agreements it brokers, but by what it does when those agreements are violated. The Washington Accords and Resolution 2773 have already been violated. What happens next will determine whether American diplomacy in the Great Lakes still carries weight.

Several issues will be especially important in the months ahead. The fate of the Luanda and Nairobi tracks will show whether any alternative diplomatic framework can regain traction. The question of whether RDF sanctions affect Rwanda's eligibility for peacekeeping reimbursements may emerge as an important lever. The humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC will continue to worsen unless the military occupation is reversed. And the role of critical minerals will grow in global importance, forcing Western governments to choose between principle and convenience.

Conclusion

Paul Kagame's interview is politically damaging because it removes ambiguity. Rwanda's president has confirmed that Rwandan forces are in eastern Congo, that he is comfortable with the military status quo, that withdrawal will not happen unless Kigali's conditions are met, and that US sanctions are, in his view, illegitimate.

The Washington Accords are not merely stalled. They have been publicly and substantively rejected by one of the parties that signed them. The United States therefore faces a stark choice. It can allow this rejection to stand, thereby confirming that agreements it brokers can be ignored with impunity, or it can respond with a combination of escalating pressure and credible diplomacy.

The people of eastern DRC have endured three decades in which their territory, lives and resources have been treated as variables in the strategic calculations of others. The United States possesses the leverage, the evidence and the diplomatic standing to alter that reality. Kagame's statements are not a minor diplomatic inconvenience. They are an open repudiation of the Washington Accords, of Resolution 2773, and of the idea that American diplomacy in the Great Lakes can still produce enforceable outcomes. Cooperation with Rwanda and sanctions against Rwanda cannot continue in parallel indefinitely. The real choice facing Washington is no longer between engagement and confrontation. It is between credibility and complicity.

FAQs

Has Rwanda officially admitted it has troops in eastern DRC?

Yes. Kagame confirmed that Rwanda's "defensive measures" include troops on the ground and equipment inside Congolese territory. That statement reinforces earlier admissions of "security coordination with RDF/M23" and aligns with multiple UN Group of Experts findings.

What are the Washington Accords and why do they matter?

The Washington Accords of 4 December 2024 were brokered by the United States to reduce tensions between Rwanda and the DRC. They required concrete steps towards de-escalation, including the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the ending of support for RDF/M23. They matter because they were the most recent major international framework for stabilising the conflict.

What sanctions has the United States imposed on Rwanda?

In March 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force as an entity and imposed measures on four senior commanders, including General James Kabarebe, for their support to M23 operations in the DRC.

Do these sanctions affect ordinary Rwandan students travelling to the United States?

No. The sanctions are targeted measures against specific individuals and military structures. They do not amount to a general restriction on Rwandan citizens or students.

What is the FDLR and does it still pose a threat?

The FDLR is a Hutu armed group formed in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Some members were implicated in that genocide. However, the group's military capacity has been heavily reduced over time. Whether it still poses a threat sufficient to justify Rwanda's actions requires an independent and transparent assessment rather than indefinite political assertion.

What is Rwanda's role in the conflict minerals trade?

UN reporting has repeatedly shown that minerals extracted from areas of eastern DRC under RDF/M23 influence are routed through Rwanda and exported with Rwandan certification. Kagame's own remarks about Rwanda welcoming minerals from "outside" reinforce the relevance of this issue.

Does Rwanda's military role in the DRC violate international law?

Yes. The use of force and support for armed proxies on the territory of another state without consent violates the UN Charter and established international legal principles, including those clarified in DRC v. Uganda.

Has Rwanda broken peace agreements before?

Yes. The Washington Accords fit a longer pattern in which Rwanda has engaged in peace frameworks but failed to implement them when compliance would conflict with strategic interests. Arusha, Lusaka, Sun City and later processes all form part of that broader pattern.

Is a diplomatic solution still possible?

Yes, but only if diplomacy is backed by meaningful consequences and verifiable benchmarks. The problem is not the absence of frameworks. It is the absence of sufficient incentive for Rwanda to comply with them.

References and Sources

Primary Source

Soudan, F. (2026) Rwanda/RDC: Interview exclusive de Paul Kagame. Jeune Afrique. Published 3 April 2026. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBTZKT2uTe4 [Accessed 4 April 2026].

 

Historical Agreements and Judicial Investigations

Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (1993). Signed 4 August 1993, Arusha, Tanzania. United Nations Peacemaker. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Bruguiere, J-L. (2006) Requete aux fins de delivrance de mandats d'arret internationaux. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. Paris: Ministry of Justice. [International arrest warrants issued for nine RPF commanders, 17 November 2006].

Andreu Merelles, F. (2008) Auto de procesamiento — Diligencias Previas 3/2008. Audiencia Nacional, Madrid. [Indictments issued against forty RPF commanders in connection with crimes in Rwanda and the DRC].

Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch.

International Court of Justice (2005) Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). Judgment of 19 December 2005. The Hague: ICJ Reports.

United Nations General Assembly (1970) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Resolution 2625 (XXV). New York: United Nations.

United Nations (2010) Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 [The UN Mapping Report]. Geneva: OHCHR. [Documents AFDL/RDF atrocities during 1996-1997 campaign].

Stearns, J. (2011) Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: PublicAffairs.

Reyntjens, F. (2009) The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Peace Agreements Referenced

Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999). Signed 10 July 1999, Lusaka, Zambia. United Nations Peacemaker. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC — Sun City Agreement (2002). Signed 19 April 2002, Sun City, South Africa. United Nations Peacemaker. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Nairobi Communique between the Government of the DRC and the CNDP (2013). Signed 24 February 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework). United Nations Peacemaker. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Nairobi Process Communiques (2022). Series of communiques issued under the East African Community-mediated Nairobi Process on the situation in eastern DRC. Available at: https://www.eac.int [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Washington Declaration on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda (2024). Signed 4 December 2024, Washington DC, United States. US Department of State.

 

United Nations and International Bodies

United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC (2025) Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations Security Council. New York: United Nations.

United Nations (2010) Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003. Geneva: OHCHR.

United Nations Security Council (2024) Resolution 2773. S/RES/2773. New York: United Nations.

 

United States Government

US Department of the Treasury (2025) Treasury Sanctions Commanders and Entities for Their Support of the M23 Rebel Group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Office of Foreign Assets Control. Washington DC: US Treasury. [March 2025].

US Department of State (2025) Washington Declaration on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, December 2024. Washington DC: Department of State.

 

Human Rights and Research Organisations

Human Rights Watch (2025) Democratic Republic of Congo: Events of 2024. New York: Human Rights Watch.

International Crisis Group (2025) Eastern Congo: Anatomy of a Crisis. Africa Report No. 318. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Himbara, D. (2025) Rwanda's economic model and the DRC conflict. Available at: https://davidhimbara.medium.com [Accessed 4 April 2026].

 

Media

US Embassy in Rwanda (2025) US Mission Agencies and Offices — Security Assistance. Available at: https://rw.usembassy.gov/u-s-mission-agencies-and-offices/ [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Stimson Center (2024) Rwanda CSPA Country Profile. Child Soldiers Prevention Act Implementation Tracker. Available at: https://www.stimson.org/project/child-soldiers/cspa-implementation-tracker/country-profiles/rwanda/ [Accessed 4 April 2026].

USAFacts (2025) How much foreign aid does the US provide to Rwanda? Available at: https://usafacts.org/answers/how-much-foreign-aid-does-the-us-provide/countries/rwanda/ [Accessed 4 April 2026].

United Nations (2026) Secretary-General appoints James Swan of the United States as Special Representative for the DRC and Head of MONUSCO, 5 March 2026. New York: United Nations.

Security Council Report (2026) Democratic Republic of the Congo, March 2026 Monthly Forecast. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Madowo, L., Nicholls, C., Princewill, N. and Dean, S. (2025) Rwanda's president says he doesn't know if his country's troops are in DRC. CNN. 3 February 2025. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/03/africa/rwanda-kigame-troops-dr-congo-intl [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Institute for Security Studies (2025) Tshisekedi, Kagame to meet on crucial eastern DRC peace deal. ISS Today. Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tshisekedi-kagame-to-meet-on-crucial-eastern-drc-peace-deal [Accessed 4 April 2026].

Del Ponte, C. and Sudetic, C. (2008) Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity. New York: Other Press. [Documents political interference in ICTR investigations into RPF crimes].

Reuters (2025) 'US imposes sanctions on Rwanda military over Congo conflict'. Reuters. March 2025.

Financial Times (2025) 'Rwanda's M23 allies take Uvira as peace deal unravels'. Financial Times. December 2024.

The Africa Report (2025) 'Kagame interview: Rwanda will not withdraw from eastern Congo'. The Africa Report. March 2025.

THE AFRICAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN

London, United Kingdom

africanrightscampaign@gmail.com

For the Peoples of the African Great Lakes Region