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Fw: *DHR* Fw: Rwandan Genocide: The response of Rwanda to the explanations of position by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.


 

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

 PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK

 RPM/873/24.04/C/2020 24 April 2020 

All Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations New York 

Excellency, I have the honour to share the response of Rwanda to the explanations of position by the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the draft resolution entitled "International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda" (A/74/L.40).
 Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. 

 H.E. Ambassador Valentine Rugwabiza 
 Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations 

CC: H.E. Mr. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande President of the United Nations General Assembly New York 

124 East 39th Street Tel: +1 212-679-9010 Email: ambanewyork@minaffet.gov.rw New York, NY 10016 Fax: +1 917-591-9279 

Rwanda's response to the explanations of position by USA and UK on the draft resolution entitled "International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda" (A/74/L.40) 

The adoption of resolution A/74/273 titled "International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda" (resolution A/74/273), elicited substantive reservations from two member states, the United States and the United Kingdom, in letters dated 20 April 2020. The United States noted concerns on the "changes made to the text starting 2018 and extended today – the narrow focus of the resolution to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda." It was further "concerned that changes to the text – starting in 2018 and extended today – narrow the focus of the resolution to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and fail to fully capture the magnitude of the violence that was committed against other groups. Many Hutus and others were also killed during the genocide, including those murdered for their opposition to the atrocities that were being committed. Failing to honor and remember these victims presents an incomplete picture of this dark part of history." 

Similarly, the reservations of the United Kingdom read, "We disagree withs the framing of the genocide purely as 'the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi'. As noted in previous resolutions, we believe that Hutus and others who were killed should also be recognised."

 It is interesting to note that while both Explanation of Positions (EOPs) underscored the importance of historical facts and collective memory in averting the recurrence of genocide, they stated the exact opposite by distorting these very historical facts and by ignoring the UN Security Council resolutions and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) jurisprudence to which they are both bound. 

Let us recall that United Nations resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 recognized genocide as a crime under international law and defined genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." 

The United Nations recognized that a crime consistent with this definition had taken place in Rwanda in 1994. Consequently, on 8 November 1994 the UNSC (resolution (955)) established the ICTR to prosecute persons responsible for the genocide between1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. The ICTR began its work in 1995 and formally closed on 20 December 2012 124 East 39th Street Tel: +1 212-679-9010 Email: ambanewyork@minaffet.gov.rw New York, NY 10016 Fax: +1 917-591-9279 having indicted 93 genocide perpetrators; its remaining functions transferred over to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on 1 July 2012. On 16 June 2006, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR in the trial of Prosecutor v. Karemera Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera (ICTR-98-44-AR73 (C)) affirmed that indeed a genocide against the Tutsi had taken place in Rwanda. It instructed that "all the current and pending trials before the Trial Chambers of the ICTR" must refer to the following as facts "beyond any dispute and not requiring any proof;" 
1) The existence of Twa, Tutsi and Hutu as protected groups falling under the Genocide Convention; 
2) The following state of affairs existed in Rwanda between 6 April 1994 to 17 July 1994: there were throughout Rwanda widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population based on Tutsi ethnic identification. During the attacks, some Rwandan citizens killed or caused serious bodily or mental harm to person[s] perceived to be Tutsi. As a result of the attacks, there were a large number of deaths of persons of Tutsi ethnic identity; 
3) Between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994 there was genocide in Rwanda against Tutsi ethnic group. 
According to the ICTR Judicial Notice, the fact that the genocide in Rwanda was against the Tutsi is "beyond any dispute and [does] not require any proof."

 Therefore, the position of the United Kingdom to "disagree with the framing of the genocide purely as the '1994 genocide against the Tutsi'" is a rejection of ICTR Jurisprudence. Similarly, both delegations hold in their EOPs, that the "others" were also killed during the genocide, is not captured by genocide as a legal term. Rwanda would welcome specific reference to "other groups" – outside the group that was the target of extermination – that the United Nations has recognized in commemoration of "past genocides." Otherwise, it would constitute an unwelcome exception for Rwanda. We therefore welcome the call by the USA to "urge fellow member states to insist that histories of past genocides" get treated with consistency in the application of shared principles. 

The demands being made against Rwanda appear to create a mechanism of remembrance outside the principles of the United Nations. However, if the positions of the United States and United Kingdom suggest the renegotiation of the UN Genocide Convention in as far as a collective decision is taken to remember "others" outside of the targeted group for extermination, then indeed this call for the renegotiation of the convention and a suggestion that as it stands the Convention is inadequate and that it should be revised beyond the "narrow" confines of targeted groups.

 In light of the UN Genocide Convention, the expectation that Rwanda broadens its framing beyond the Tutsi as the targeted group for extermination, is to demand that Rwanda applies and violates the Convention at ounce. 124 East 39th Street Tel: +1 212-679-9010 Email: ambanewyork@minaffet.gov.rw New York, NY 10016 Fax: +1 917-591-9279 Similarly, like in the terminology that in fact the genocide was against the Tutsi, the distinction between free speech and hate speech was also settled as part of a judicial process: The Media Trial in The Prosecutor V. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze (Case No. ICTR-99-51-T), whose aim was to draw the line between free speech and hate speech. Once again, the ICTR jurisprudence has cleared any ambiguity between free speech and hate speech in the context of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It is worth recalling the role that the Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) played during the execution of the genocide by calling for acceleration of the killings and publications of names and physical addresses of Tutsi individuals and families yet to be exterminated. Despite the active role of the RTLM in the execution of the genocide, when a permanent member was requested to jam the radio's frequency, it refused to extend that assistance to the pursued targets citing free speech.

 In the pursuit of reconciliation, Rwanda has walked the tight rope of applying the Convention of commemorating the group that was targeted for extermination while being as inclusive as possible without compromising the very purpose of genocide commemoration. For instance, every annual commemoration of the genocide, Rwanda devotes 13th April to the remembrance of politicians and others who, although not being part of the targeted group, were killed for opposing the extermination of Tutsis.

 By bringing clarity on the targeted group for extermination, the just adopted Resolution A/74/273 and adoption of decision A/72/L.31 on 26 January 2018, are consistent with the Genocide Convention. Rather than advance reconciliation, the EOPs by the US and the UK bring ambiguity that feeds the resurgent genocide denialist movement that is already on the rise in the Great Lakes region and beyond. 

Rwanda supports the US call for member states to hold those responsible for genocide accountable and takes this opportunity to remind the United Kingdom to arrest and try genocide suspects on its territory who are yet to face justice for their role in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, as one of the strong measures to prevent impunity and the recurrence of genocide. 

Finally, with regard to the negotiation process, Rwanda has neither the authority nor the desire to "force" any member into accepting a resolution language. The language in resolution A/74/273 is a result of consultations with all members in open ended format, and in small groups and bilateral format with members having expressed specific concerns.. However, as is always the case for any multilateral process, not every concern raised by individual members without enjoying a broad consensus can be accommodated. 



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