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[AfricaRealities.com] Rwanda 2017: Potential Scenarios (excerpts from the 2011 Africom Report on Rwanda) [1 Attachment]

  • The question of who will succeed President Kagame—and when—will be a source of uncertain- ty and possible contention. The RPF's power, decisionmaking, public relations strategy, and le- gitimacy rest overwhelmingly with Kagame, and his departure would dramatically change how the regime is perceived. The elections in

    2017 could be a moment for a significant
    political break. Kagame is constitutionally
    prohibited from running for a third term,
    although given the RPF's control over the
    legislature and the legislature's deference
    to him, a term extension is very plausible.
    Constitutional changes of this kind are becoming less and less acceptable to African regional bodies and the international community. Forcing through such a change in Rwanda in 2017 could provoke a more sustained campaign by opposition leaders, particularly if backed by dip- lomatic support from African regional bodies or the international community. If Kagame were to step down, it is today hard to imagine that the RPF would countenance any election process that might entail their defeat. Opposition parties in the diaspora appear to be building toward a unified cross-ethnic platform, and by 2017 may be adequately resourced and organized to present a real challenge in a free and fair election process. Rwanda's last two elections do not bode well for its next one. There is some possibility—albeit slim—that President Kagame will be pushed out of office by elements within the RPF. That some of his most senior confidants have defected in recent years underscores this possibility—some of these former commanders may still enjoy the allegiance of a segment of the RPF or the military forces. Kagame is surely attuned to this possibility, and he has replaced these senior leaders with a younger set of loyal- ists without popular constituencies or alliances of their own, who are entirely beholden to him.

Rwanda's last two elections do not bode well for its next one. 

http://csis.org/files/publication/110623_Cooke_Rwanda_Web.pdf


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