Skip to main content

US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide

US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide

Classified papers show Clinton was aware of 'final solution' to eliminate Tutsis
President Bill Clinton's administration knew Rwanda was being engulfed by genocide in April 1994 but buried the information to justify its inaction, according to classified documents made available for the first time.
Senior officials privately used the word genocide within 16 days of the start of the killings, but chose not to do so publicly because the president had already decided not to intervene.
Intelligence reports obtained using the US Freedom of Information Act show the cabinet and almost certainly the president had been told of a planned "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis" before the slaughter reached its peak.
It took Hutu death squads three months from April 6 to murder an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus and at each stage accurate, detailed reports were reaching Washington's top policymakers.
The documents undermine claims by Mr Clinton and his senior officials that they did not fully appreciate the scale and speed of the killings.
"It's powerful proof that they knew," said Alison des Forges, a Human Rights Watch researcher and authority on the genocide.
The National Security Archive, an independent non-governmental research institute based in Washington DC, went to court to obtain the material.
It discovered that the CIA's national intelligence daily, a secret briefing circulated to Mr Clinton, the then vice-president, Al Gore, and hundreds of senior officials, included almost daily reports on Rwanda. One, dated April 23, said rebels would continue fighting to "stop the genocide, which ... is spreading south".
Three days later the state department's intelligence briefing for former secretary of state Warren Christopher and other officials noted "genocide and partition" and reported declarations of a "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis".
However, the administration did not publicly use the word genocide until May 25 and even then diluted its impact by saying "acts of genocide".
Ms Des Forges said: "They feared this word would generate public opinion which would demand some sort of action and they didn't want to act. It was a very pragmatic determination."
The administration did not want to repeat the fiasco of US intervention in Somalia, where US troops became sucked into fighting. It also felt the US had no interests in Rwanda, a small central African country with no minerals or strategic value.
William Ferroggiaro, of the National Security Archive, said the system had worked. "Diplomats, intelligence agencies, defence and military officials - even aid workers - provided timely information up the chain," he said.
"That the Clinton administration decided against intervention at any level was not for lack of knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda."
Many analysts and historians fault Washington and other western capitals not just for failing to support the token force of overwhelmed UN peacekeepers but for failing to speak out more forcefully during the slaughter.
Some of the Hutu extremists orchestrating events might have heeded such warnings, they have suggested.
Mr Clinton has apologised for those failures but the declassified documents undermine his defence of ignorance. "The level of US intelligence is really amazing," said Mr Ferroggiaro. "A vast array of information was available."
On a visit to the Rwandan capital, Kigali, in 1998 Mr Clinton apologised for not acting quickly enough or immediately calling the crimes genocide.
In what was widely seen as an attempt to diminish his responsibility, he said: "It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."
A spokesperson for the William Jefferson Clinton Foundation in New York said the allegations would be relayed to the former president.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Le Troisième Mandat de Louise Mushikiwabo à l'OIF : Entre Précédent et Principe Démocratique.

Le Troisième Mandat de Louise Mushikiwabo à l'OIF : Entre Précédent et Principe Démocratique. L'Alternance à l'OIF : Pourquoi un Troisième Mandat Fragilise la Crédibilité de la Francophonie. Introduction Louise Mushikiwabo veut un troisième mandat à la tête de l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. Son annonce, faite bien avant l'émergence d'autres candidats, rappelle une tactique familière en Afrique : affirmer qu'on a le soutien populaire sans jamais le prouver publiquement. La méthode est rodée. Des dirigeants africains l'utilisent depuis des décennies pour prolonger leur règne. Ils clament que "le peuple le demande" ou que "les partenaires soutiennent" cette reconduction. Aucune preuve formelle n'est nécessaire. L'affirmation devient réalité politique. Mais voilà le problème : la Francophonie prêche la démocratie, l'État de droit et l'alternance au pouvoir. Peut-elle tolérer en son sein ce qu...

Pourquoi les sanctions américaines contre le Rwanda sont-elles si importantes ?

Pourquoi les sanctions américaines contre le Rwanda sont-elles si importantes ? Auteur : The African Rights Campaign. Londres, Royaume-Uni Publié en : mars 2026   Introduction Lorsqu'un gouvernement est accusé d'exécutions extrajudiciaires, de déplacements massifs, de violences sexuelles, de violations des droits de l'homme et du pillage systématique des ressources naturelles d'un pays voisin, la réponse diplomatique attendue est un démenti catégorique, étayé par des preuves. Le Rwanda ne l'a pas fait. Lorsque le département américain du Trésor a imposé des sanctions aux Forces de défense rwandaises (FDR) et à quatre de leurs commandants les plus haut placés, le 2 mars 2026, la porte-parole officielle de Kigali, Yolande Makolo, a délivré une déclaration que les analystes diplomatiques étudieront attentivement pour ce qu'elle omet conspicuement. Elle a dit que les sanctions étaient « injustes », qu'elles ciblaient « uniquement...

Rubaya Mine Under USA’s Control: Kagame Has No Grounds to Object.

Rubaya Mine: Strategic Interests, Regional Conflict and the DRC–USA Cooperation Framework Rubaya mine, located in Masisi territory in North Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, is a Congolese resource. It was a Congolese resource before the M23 advanced on it, it remains a Congolese resource today, and it will remain a Congolese resource regardless of what any regional actor claims, implies or pursues. That is not a political position. It is a statement of international law and sovereign right. This foundational point must be stated plainly because it is frequently obscured in discussions about the conflict in eastern Congo. Debates about security narratives, mineral partnerships and geopolitical alignment risk creating a false impression that Rubaya's ownership or governance is somehow open to negotiation between external parties. It is not. The Democratic Republic of the Congo holds sovereign authority over its territory and its natural resources. N...

BBC News

Africanews

UNDP - Africa Job Vacancies

How We Made It In Africa – Insight into business in Africa

Migration Policy Institute