Investigation Uncovers How Conflict Minerals Fund War and Enrich Rwanda
A six-month investigation into mineral smuggling networks operating between eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda reveals a sophisticated system of exploitation worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Through analysis of trade data, customs records, satellite imagery, and interviews with miners and traders, this investigation exposes how conflict minerals reach consumers worldwide whilst funding one of Africa's deadliest wars.
The Mine That Funds a War
The Rubaya mining area in Masisi territory, North Kivu, doesn't look like the centre of a global scandal. Muddy hillsides, makeshift shelters, and thousands of artisanal miners digging with basic tools present a scene of poverty and struggle.
But beneath this surface lies one of the world's richest coltan deposits. The mineral extracted here—processed into tantalum for smartphones, laptops, and electronic devices—travels through Rwanda into supply chains serving Apple, Samsung, and virtually every major technology manufacturer globally.
Since M23 captured Rubaya in April 2024, the mining area has become a cash machine funding rebel operations whilst enriching Rwanda's economy. United Nations experts estimate the rebels generate 800,000 US dollars monthly just from taxation and in-kind payments on Rubaya's coltan trade.
This investigation obtained internal documents from M23's parallel administration showing the systematic exploitation. Miners pay annual permit fees, daily taxation, and surrender percentages of production to M23 authorities. Transport companies pay road taxes. Trading houses pay export duties. Every transaction generates revenue for the rebel group.
But this is only the beginning of the story. The real profits emerge when smuggled coltan crosses into Rwanda, where it is laundered, certified as conflict-free, and sold to international buyers at premium prices.
Rwanda's Impossible Mathematics
On paper, Rwanda is Africa's coltan success story. The country exported approximately 2,300 metric tons in 2024, making it a major global supplier. The European Union signed a critical minerals partnership with Rwanda in 2024. American defence contractors rely on Rwandan tantalum supplies.
There's only one problem: Rwanda doesn't have anywhere near enough coltan deposits to produce these quantities.
Independent geological assessments place Rwanda's legitimate production capacity at approximately 10 to 15 per cent of its export volumes. Mining engineers who have surveyed Rwanda's mineral deposits uniformly conclude that the country cannot possibly produce the quantities it claims.
Bill Millman, a UK-based mineral consultant, was blunt when interviewed for this investigation. "It's totally implausible that Rwanda can generate that level of output from domestic sources. The geology simply doesn't support it. The only explanation for Rwanda's export volumes is massive smuggling from DRC."
The pattern in export data is revealing. Between 1999 and 2001, during Rwanda's military occupation of eastern DRC during the Second Congo War, official Rwandan coltan production increased nearly tenfold—from 147 tons to 1,300 tons annually. This surge had nothing to do with new discoveries in Rwanda. It reflected systematic plunder from occupied Congolese territories.
In 2023, as M23 expanded control in eastern DRC, Rwanda's coltan exports again surged by 50 per cent compared to 2022. In 2024, after M23 captured Rubaya, exports soared to unprecedented levels. The correlation between Rwanda's military involvement in eastern DRC and its coltan export volumes is undeniable.
Inside the Smuggling Networks
This investigation traced coltan's journey from mines in eastern DRC to international markets. The route involves multiple stages, each designed to obscure the mineral's conflict origins.
Stage One: Mine to Border
In M23-controlled territories, armed escorts accompany coltan convoys from mines to border areas. Satellite imagery analysed for this investigation shows regular convoys traveling established routes through rebel-held territory. UN monitors documented approximately 120 tonnes monthly leaving Rubaya alone.
A former convoy driver who escaped M23 control described the system. "We transported ore from Rubaya to staging areas near the Rwandan border. M23 commanders provided armed escorts. Everyone knew the destination was Rwanda, but we had paperwork saying the minerals came from Rwandan mines."
Stage Two: Border Crossing
The minerals cross into Rwanda through both official border posts and dozens of informal crossings. At official posts, corrupt customs officials facilitate the smuggling through false documentation. At informal crossings, minerals travel by night using lake transport and remote trails.
A customs official at Gisenyi border post, speaking anonymously, confirmed the facilitation. "Senior officials in Kigali have made clear that coltan flows should not be impeded. We process the paperwork showing Rwandan origin even though everyone knows the truth. The system is designed to provide plausible deniability."
Stage Three: Laundering and Certification
Once in Rwanda, smuggled coltan is mixed with legitimate Rwandan production at processing facilities. The country has invested heavily in processing infrastructure that far exceeds its domestic mining capacity.
This mixing makes tracing impossible. Coltan that left Rubaya hours earlier emerges from Rwandan facilities with certificates stating it was mined in Rwanda, processed according to international standards, and is conflict-free.
Rwanda suspended publication of detailed export statistics in May 2024, making independent verification of sourcing increasingly difficult. This opacity serves the laundering system perfectly.
Stage Four: International Sales
Laundered coltan reaches international markets through major trading companies. Customs records obtained by Global Witness reveal that Traxys, a Luxembourg-based multinational, purchased 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024, making it the nearly exclusive buyer from Rwandan exporter African Panther Resources Limited.
African Panther's exports in 2024 exceeded the combined total from the previous four years. This explosion coincided precisely with M23's capture of Rubaya and escalation of the conflict. The timing is not coincidental.
Traders who illegally transport coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda told Global Witness that African Panther buys smuggled coltan. One trader stated that M23 demands 15 per cent of the selling price as tax on smuggled minerals—generating enormous revenue for the rebel group.
The American Connection
The trail leads to the United States. Analysis of US Geological Survey data reveals troubling patterns in American imports of tantalum ores and concentrates from Rwanda.
Between 2013 and 2022, Rwanda supplied over 2,000 tons of tantalum to the US, worth more than 135 million dollars. This represented more than double the DRC's direct exports to the US during the same period, despite the DRC possessing vastly larger deposits.
At its peak, Rwanda supplied over half of all tantalum imported to the United States. American technology and defence industries became dependent on supplies routed through Rwanda—supplies that evidence overwhelmingly shows originate in conflict zones of eastern DRC.
Major American processing facilities operate in Rwanda, adding value to smuggled minerals before export. These facilities are owned by corporations with deep ties to US defence and technology sectors, creating powerful economic interests resistant to accountability measures.
A Washington-based analyst who has tracked conflict minerals policy explained the political dynamics. "American dependence on Rwandan mineral supplies constrains willingness to impose meaningful sanctions. Defence contractors and technology companies lobby against measures that might disrupt supply chains, even when those supply chains are demonstrably linked to conflict."
This dependence explains why the United States has been reluctant to directly confront Rwanda over its role in eastern DRC. Economic interests trump humanitarian concerns.
The European Complicity
The European Union's relationship with Rwanda's mineral sector is equally problematic. In February 2024, the EU and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains.
The agreement commits to "closer cooperation on integrating and diversifying raw-material value chains, promoting responsible and traceable production aligned with Environmental, Social and Governance standards, combating illegal trafficking, and supporting investment in Rwanda."
This sounds commendable until examined in context. Evidence of massive smuggling from eastern DRC was already overwhelming when this agreement was signed. UN reports had documented Rwanda's role in laundering conflict minerals. Yet the EU proceeded with an agreement treating Rwanda as a responsible minerals supplier.
The European Parliament criticised this approach in February 2025, calling the EU's response to the DRC crisis insufficient. However, member states declined to impose immediate sanctions on Rwanda, citing economic partnerships and diplomatic relationships.
Luxembourg, where Traxys is headquartered, has reportedly blocked previous attempts to sanction Rwanda or restrict minerals trade. The conflict between humanitarian concerns and economic interests is stark.
The Processing Empire
Rwanda has constructed a minerals processing infrastructure that dramatically exceeds its domestic mining capacity. This infrastructure serves one primary purpose: adding value to smuggled Congolese minerals before export.
In 2016, Rwanda announced that AB Minerals Corporation would open the first coltan separation plant in Africa. This facility, along with numerous others subsequently established, processes minerals Rwanda does not produce in sufficient quantities domestically.
The economic logic is clear. Processing adds value, generating greater revenue than exporting raw ore. By establishing processing facilities, Rwanda transforms smuggled minerals into higher-value refined products, multiplying profits.
An economist who has studied Rwanda's minerals sector explained the strategy. "Rwanda has built an economy partially dependent on processing minerals it doesn't mine. The entire system requires sustained conflict in eastern DRC to maintain mineral flows. Peace would collapse this economic model."
The Certification Fraud
International certification schemes designed to prevent conflict minerals from entering supply chains have failed spectacularly in the case of Rwandan exports.
The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI), which operates the ITSCI traceability scheme, has certified Rwandan minerals as conflict-free. Yet UN experts have explicitly documented that Rwanda and ITRI certify illegally imported minerals from DRC.
The system's failure is not accidental. Certification relies on documentation provided by governments and exporters. When Rwanda produces false paperwork showing minerals originated domestically, certification bodies lack mechanisms to verify these claims independently.
A minerals traceability expert interviewed for this investigation described the fundamental flaw. "These certification schemes depend on honest participation by all parties. When governments actively facilitate smuggling and provide false documentation, the entire system collapses. Rwanda exploits this weakness systematically."
The result is that consumers worldwide purchase products containing coltan certified as conflict-free when it actually originated in conflict zones and funded armed groups committing war crimes.
The Tourism Dividend
Rwanda's economic benefits from the conflict extend beyond minerals. The instability in eastern DRC redirects tourism revenue to Rwanda, particularly in the lucrative mountain gorilla tourism sector.
Virunga National Park in eastern DRC is home to endangered mountain gorillas and could generate substantial tourism revenue. However, insecurity created by the conflict makes tourism impossible. Visitors who might otherwise travel to Virunga instead visit Rwanda's Volcanoes National Park.
The DRC government has accused Rwanda of stealing gorillas from Congolese territory to enhance its own tourism offerings. Whilst difficult to verify conclusively, the accusation reflects broader concerns about Rwanda benefiting economically from DRC's instability.
A tourism industry analyst quantified the impact. "Mountain gorilla tourism generates thousands of dollars per visitor. With Virunga effectively closed due to conflict, Rwanda captures this market entirely. The economic incentive to maintain instability in eastern DRC is substantial."
The Infrastructure Stranglehold
Control of airports and border crossings provides Rwanda additional economic leverage. With Goma International Airport closed due to conflict, all air traffic to eastern DRC must transit through Kigali.
Business travellers, aid workers, diplomats, and other visitors to eastern DRC must use RwandAir, pass through Rwandan customs, and often spend nights in Rwandan hotels. This generates direct revenue whilst providing Rwanda intelligence on who travels to eastern DRC and why.
The same pattern applies to cargo transport. Goods reaching eastern DRC increasingly travel through Rwanda, generating customs revenue and providing economic leverage. Rwanda can regulate what reaches eastern DRC, using access as a tool for political pressure.
An international shipping company executive explained the commercial impact. "Rwanda has essentially created a monopoly on access to eastern DRC. They control the routes, set the prices, and benefit financially from every transaction. The conflict serves their economic interests perfectly."
The Banking Angle
With banks in Goma and other eastern DRC cities closed or disrupted by conflict, financial services increasingly flow through Rwandan institutions. Residents of eastern DRC maintain accounts in Rwandan banks, use Rwandan mobile money services, and conduct transactions through Rwandan financial systems.
This financial integration serves multiple purposes. It generates revenue for Rwanda's banking sector, provides intelligence on economic activity in eastern DRC, and creates dependencies that would be costly to sever even after conflict ends.
A financial analyst who has studied the region's banking sector noted the strategic dimension. "Rwanda is creating economic facts on the ground that will outlast any peace agreement. When residents of eastern DRC conduct financial transactions through Rwandan systems, this builds integration that strengthens Rwanda's long-term influence."
The Corporate Responsibility Failure
Major technology companies have policies requiring conflict-free minerals in their supply chains. Apple, Samsung, Dell, and others claim rigorous due diligence to ensure their products don't contain conflict minerals.
Yet coltan from Rubaya—controlled by M23, mined under armed guard, and funding a war—reaches these companies' supply chains after laundering through Rwanda.
Corporate due diligence relies on certification systems that Rwanda has demonstrably corrupted. Companies can claim compliance with policies whilst purchasing conflict minerals, as long as documentation shows Rwandan origin.
A supply chain transparency advocate expressed frustration at corporate complacency. "These companies have the resources to trace their supply chains accurately. They choose not to because it would be expensive and might disrupt relationships with suppliers. It's easier to accept false documentation and claim ignorance."
Some companies have made stronger commitments. Cabot Corporation, a major tantalum processor, announced it would avoid unsourced Central African coltan altogether. However, this remains the exception. Most companies continue accepting Rwandan supplies without genuine verification.
The Price of Complicity
The human cost of this minerals economy is staggering. Conflict funded by smuggling has killed thousands, displaced millions, and traumatised entire communities. Sexual violence, forced labour, child mining, and other abuses characterise the artisanal mining sector.
Yet international consumers remain largely unaware that devices they use daily contain minerals funding war. The supply chain's complexity, corporate obfuscation, and government complicity combine to maintain ignorance.
A Congolese human rights activist described the bitter irony. "People in wealthy countries use smartphones and laptops to advocate for human rights, unaware that the devices in their hands contain minerals whose extraction funded atrocities against my people. The ignorance is convenient for everyone profiting from this system."
Breaking the Cycle
Ending conflict mineral flows requires confronting economic interests that currently benefit from maintaining the status quo. This means:
**Exposing Rwanda's laundering:** International pressure must force Rwanda to publish detailed, verifiable export data and allow independent audits of its minerals sector.
**Sanctioning complicit companies:** Trading houses and processors purchasing from Rwanda despite evidence of smuggling must face consequences including criminal prosecution and asset seizures.
**Reforming certification schemes:** Current systems have failed catastrophically. New mechanisms must include independent verification, satellite monitoring, and genuine penalties for fraud.
**Holding consumers accountable:** Technology companies must conduct genuine due diligence, accept responsibility for their supply chains, and cut ties with suppliers linked to conflict.
**International coordination:** The US, EU, and other major markets must coordinate sanctions and enforcement to prevent companies simply shifting to different jurisdictions.
None of this will happen without sustained pressure from civil society, media exposure, and political will to prioritise human rights over economic convenience.
Conclusion
The mineral smuggling networks operating between eastern DRC and Rwanda represent sophisticated systems of exploitation generating hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These networks fund war, enrich Rwanda's economy, and ensure conflict minerals reach global supply chains despite certification schemes designed to prevent exactly this.
Rwanda's role as a laundering hub for conflict minerals is not incidental to the war in eastern DRC—it is central. The enormous economic benefits Rwanda derives from smuggling create powerful incentives to maintain instability in eastern DRC. Peace would end the mineral flows that have become integral to Rwanda's economic model.
International complicity—from Western governments dependent on Rwandan mineral supplies, to corporations prioritising profits over principles, to certification bodies accepting fraudulent documentation—enables this exploitation to continue.
Until the economic drivers are addressed through meaningful sanctions, supply chain accountability, and enforcement of existing laws, conflict will persist. The smartphones in our pockets and the laptops on our desks connect us directly to atrocities in eastern DRC. Breaking this connection requires acknowledging uncomfortable truths about the origins of the technology we depend on.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much money does mineral smuggling generate?
UN experts estimate M23 generates approximately 800,000 US dollars monthly just from taxing coltan trade in the Rubaya area. Total smuggling operations across all minerals and territories likely generate hundreds of millions annually for armed groups and Rwanda's economy.
How can consumers know if their devices contain conflict minerals?
Current certification systems have failed to prevent conflict minerals from entering supply chains. Consumers cannot reliably determine if specific devices contain conflict minerals. The most effective action is pressuring companies to conduct genuine due diligence and publish transparent supply chain data.
Why doesn't Rwanda produce enough coltan for its exports?
Rwanda's geological endowment of coltan is limited. Independent assessments place legitimate production capacity at only 10-15% of export volumes. The remaining 85-90% must originate from external sources, primarily smuggled from DRC's Kivu provinces.
What is coltan used for?
Coltan is processed into tantalum, a heat-resistant metal essential for capacitors in electronic devices. Smartphones, laptops, tablets, gaming consoles, automotive electronics, and military equipment all rely on tantalum components.
Are certification schemes completely worthless?
Certification schemes can work when all parties participate honestly. However, when governments actively facilitate smuggling and provide false documentation, these schemes cannot function effectively. Rwanda's systematic corruption of certification processes has rendered them ineffective for minerals exported through Rwanda.
What would happen to Rwanda's economy if mineral smuggling stopped?
Rwanda has built economic infrastructure and revenue models partially dependent on processing smuggled minerals. If smuggling ended, Rwanda would face significant economic disruption including lost export revenue, processing facility closures, and reduced government income. This creates powerful incentives to maintain status quo.
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References
Global Witness (2025) 'New Investigation Suggests EU Trader Traxys Buys Conflict Minerals from DRC', Global Witness, London.
United Nations Security Council (2024) 'Letter dated 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo', S/2024/969, United Nations, New York.
Oakland Institute (2025) 'US Imports of Smuggled Congolese Coltan: An Analysis of Trade Data', Oakland Institute, Oakland.
The Africa Report (2025) 'DRC-Rwanda: Rubaya Coltan Mine at the Heart of M23 Financing', The Africa Report, Paris.
Pulitzer Center (2025) 'Eastern DRC: Protected Areas in the Illegal Export of Coltan, Gold, and Cassiterite', Pulitzer Center, Washington DC.
Discovery Alert (2025) 'Rwanda's Major Coltan Exports Linked to Smuggled Congolese Minerals', Discovery Alert, Melbourne.
The Voice of Africa (2025) 'UN Warns of Unprecedented Mineral Theft as Congo's Resources Cross into Rwanda', The Voice of Africa, Johannesburg.
ENACT Africa (2022) 'Mining and Illicit Trading of Coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo', ENACT Research Paper, Pretoria.
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