Why the CEPGL Was Sidelined After 1994: Security Doctrine, Regional Realignment and Strategic Choices in the Great Lakes

Introduction

The decline of the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) after 1994 was not accidental. It was the result of a profound geopolitical rupture in the Great Lakes region. Established in 1976 by Burundi, Rwanda and the then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the CEPGL aimed to promote economic cooperation, free movement and political dialogue among neighbours whose histories and borders are deeply intertwined.

Yet after the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana in April 1994 and the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, the organisation gradually faded from political relevance.

Some argue that the explanation lies primarily in Rwanda's post-genocide security doctrine and alleged regional ambitions. Others point to broader systemic collapse and the wars that engulfed Congo. A further dimension complicates the narrative: Rwanda did not reject multilateral cooperation. Instead, it embraced the East African Community (EAC), joining in 2007.

If multilateralism remained strategically useful to Kigali, why was the CEPGL sidelined?

The answer lies in the intersection of security imperatives, institutional fragility, political mistrust and regional realignment.

The 1994 Rupture: When Cooperation Became Secondary to Survival

The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda fundamentally reshaped the strategic outlook of the new government led by Paul Kagame. Preventing any future existential threat became the core organising principle of national security.

Large refugee flows into eastern Zaire included former armed elements responsible for mass violence. Kigali perceived the situation not as a diplomatic challenge but as a security emergency.

This perception culminated in the First Congo War (1996–1997) and later the Second Congo War (1998–2003). In that environment, economic cooperation and structured dialogue under the CEPGL framework became politically secondary to border control and regime survival.

The CEPGL had not been designed as a post-conflict security mechanism. It depended on a baseline of intergovernmental trust that had evaporated.

The Congo Wars and the Institutional Collapse of Trust

The wars in Congo transformed the Great Lakes from a cooperative zone into a competitive security arena. Armed movements, cross-border interventions and rival alliances became dominant features of regional politics.

The UN Mapping Report documented grave violations committed between 1993 and 2003, further intensifying contested narratives and mutual suspicion.

Three structural weaknesses limited the CEPGL's resilience:

It lacked supranational enforcement authority.
It relied heavily on presidential consensus.
It had limited independent financial capacity.

An organisation structured around summit diplomacy cannot function when member states are engaged in direct or indirect confrontation.

After 1994, political momentum behind the CEPGL diminished rapidly.

Security Doctrine Versus Expansionist Interpretation

A key debate concerns whether the CEPGL was marginalised because it could have constrained broader strategic ambitions in eastern Congo.

From Rwanda's official perspective, cross-border military engagement was justified as a defensive necessity against hostile armed groups. The doctrine emphasised prevention and deterrence.

From parts of Congolese public discourse, repeated cycles of intervention and influence are interpreted as reflecting longer-term strategic interests in eastern provinces.

Both narratives exist simultaneously in regional debate.

What is analytically evident is that an active CEPGL would have required sustained dialogue on sovereignty, armed groups, refugee management and border transparency. Such institutionalisation can constrain unilateral flexibility.

When mistrust is high, governments may prefer strategic manoeuvrability over binding multilateral frameworks.

Why the East African Community Was Different

If Rwanda's priority was purely security-driven, why join the EAC?

The distinction lies in the type of multilateralism.

The EAC offered:

Access to a broader and economically dynamic market.
Institutional predictability and structured integration.
Trade corridors to the Indian Ocean.
Less immediate historical entanglement with Congo's security disputes.

Unlike the CEPGL, the EAC was not primarily focused on the highly sensitive Rwanda–DRC–Burundi triangle. Its agenda centred on customs union, common market and economic harmonisation.

Choosing the EAC did not signal rejection of cooperation. It reflected strategic diversification and economic alignment.

Institutional Fragility Beyond Rwanda

It would be analytically incomplete to attribute the CEPGL's decline solely to Rwanda's strategy.

The DRC after 1997 faced deep internal instability. Burundi endured a prolonged civil war. Financial contributions to regional institutions were inconsistent.

The CEPGL lacked the structural robustness required to withstand regime change and protracted conflict. Without independent funding, legal authority and administrative insulation, it became vulnerable to political shocks.

Lived Realities at the Border

For civilians in Goma, Bukavu or Uvira, the absence of a functioning regional framework has direct consequences.

Border closures disrupt trade. Prices rise. Insecurity spreads. Informal traders lose livelihoods overnight.

These lived experiences illustrate a fundamental lesson: when regional institutions weaken, local vulnerability increases.

The absence of routine dialogue channels heightens the risk of escalation.

Challenges to Revival

Reviving the CEPGL today would require overcoming:

Persistent distrust between Kinshasa and Kigali.
Overlapping memberships in multiple regional blocs.
Politically sensitive historical grievances.
Domestic pressures limiting diplomatic compromise.

Institutional reform alone cannot substitute for political will.

Opportunities in the Current Context

Despite challenges, several trends create new openings:

The DRC joined the EAC in 2022, meaning CEPGL members now share broader integration frameworks.
Economic interdependence in border regions remains strong.
Global mineral supply chains require traceability and cooperative governance.
Regional fatigue with instability is increasing.

A modernised CEPGL could specialise in conflict prevention, early-warning mechanisms and structured security dialogue, complementing the EAC's economic mandate.

Future Outlook

For the CEPGL to regain relevance, it must evolve.

Instead of focusing narrowly on economic integration, it could become:

A permanent security dialogue platform.
A cross-border early-warning institution.
A mechanism for managing refugee and armed-group issues.
A confidence-building structure between capitals.

The region's stability depends not only on economic integration but on sustained diplomatic engagement tailored to its specific triangular dynamics.

Conclusion

The sidelining of the CEPGL after 1994 was not the result of a single policy decision. It emerged from systemic war, regime change, institutional weakness and strategic recalibration.

Rwanda did not abandon multilateralism. It embraced the EAC, a framework aligned with economic priorities and less burdened by immediate security disputes. At the same time, unresolved tensions between Rwanda and the DRC made the CEPGL politically difficult to sustain.

The central issue today is not historical blame but structural necessity. The Great Lakes region still lacks a specialised, credible and permanent mechanism dedicated to managing its most sensitive inter-state relationship.

Without such a framework, crises will continue to be addressed reactively. With it, there remains the possibility of transforming cyclical confrontation into structured prevention.

FAQs

Why did the CEPGL decline after 1994?

Because genocide, war and regime change destroyed trust between member states and shifted priorities toward immediate security concerns.

Did Rwanda abandon multilateral cooperation?

No. Rwanda joined the East African Community in 2007, demonstrating continued commitment to regional integration.

Was the CEPGL sidelined to allow expansionist policies?

This interpretation exists in regional political debate, but Rwanda officially frames its actions as security-driven.

Can the CEPGL be revived?

Yes, but only through institutional reform combined with sustained political commitment from all member states.

References

Reyntjens, F. (2009) The Great African War. Cambridge University Press.

Prunier, G. (2009) Africa's World War. Oxford University Press.

United Nations (2010) Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Mapping Exercise Report. OHCHR.

Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (1976) Founding Convention.

East African Community (Treaty, 1999, amended 2007).

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