Introduction.
At the 20th Umushyikirano National Dialogue Council in Kigali in February 2026, President Paul Kagame publicly stated that it is acceptable for minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo to pass through Rwanda and be sold internationally. Whilst defending Rwanda's ambitions to become a mineral processing hub, he likened this practice to passengers travelling through Kigali airport en route to other destinations, arguing that whilst wealthy countries benefit most from this trade, Rwanda's participation is normal and justified. However, this framing fundamentally misrepresents a deeply troubling reality: the minerals in question are not legitimately transiting through Rwanda as part of normal trade, but are being extracted under conditions of conflict, violence, and mass suffering imposed by Rwandan-backed forces.
The distinction between legitimate cross-border trade and the current situation cannot be overstated. Cross-border commerce between Rwanda and the DRC is, in principle, legitimate and economically beneficial for regional development. Normal trade presupposes consent, sovereignty, and legality. However, the existing mineral flows from eastern DRC through Rwanda fail on all three counts. Sovereignty is compromised when minerals are removed from Congolese soil under conditions created by foreign-backed armed groups. Consent is absent when communities are displaced to clear access to mines and transport corridors. Legality is breached when extraction and export circumvent Congolese authorities and international due-diligence standards.
The current reality is not a normal commercial relationship but a system shaped by armed conflict, coercion, and displacement. Minerals are not merely transiting through Rwanda; they are extracted from Congolese territory under conditions of violence, facilitated by war, and laundered into global markets. This occurs within a context of military aggression, territorial occupation, forced displacement of millions, and systematic human rights violations. United Nations experts, international human rights organisations, and multiple governments have documented that these minerals are being extracted from areas controlled by the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, which is backed by between 7,000 and 12,000 Rwandan Defence Force troops.
The Context of Conflict and Mineral Exploitation
Since January 2025, eastern DRC has experienced its worst humanitarian crisis in over a decade. The M23 rebel group, with substantial Rwandan military support, captured Goma on 27 January 2025, followed by Bukavu on 16 February and Uvira immediately after signing the Washington Accord, effectively placing North and South Kivu provinces under rebel control. The human cost has been catastrophic: over 15,000 civilians killed since January 2025 alone, more than 7.3 million people internally displaced across the country, with 5.2 million displaced specifically in eastern regions. Nearly 122,500 people have fled to neighbouring countries, including over 70,000 to Uganda and 40,000 to Burundi.
The conflict has created what the United Nations describes as one of the world's largest displacement crises. Approximately 26.6 million Congolese face acute food insecurity, with humanitarian operations severely disrupted by fighting, looting of aid warehouses, and closure of critical infrastructure. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 21 million people require humanitarian assistance, making DRC the country with the highest number of people in need globally.
Behind these staggering figures lies systematic resource extraction. UN experts documented in December 2024 that M23 controlled trading centres in Rubaya and Mushaki, as well as mineral transport routes from Rubaya to Rwanda, where Rubaya minerals were mixed with Rwandan production. This constitutes what the UN called the "most significant contamination of supply chains with ineligible '3T' minerals recorded in the Great Lakes region over the past decade". Rubaya alone produces approximately 15 per cent of the world's tantalum supply, with M23 earning an estimated $800,000 monthly from ore trade.
Rwanda has created mineral processing factories aimed at processing Congolese minerals including tungsten. Some of these factories are owned by American companies, and this may explain why the United States is hesitating to impose comprehensive sanctions on Rwanda after it violated the Washington Accord.
The Problem with Kagame's Airport Analogy: A Strategy of Economic Subjugation
President Kagame's comparison of mineral transit to airport passengers fundamentally fails on several critical levels, but more disturbingly, it reveals a calculated strategy of economic capture and regional dominance. The Umushyikirano remarks framed Rwanda as a logistical corridor rather than a beneficiary of conflict minerals. The analogy to air transit suggests neutrality: goods merely pass through, value is added elsewhere, and responsibility lies with end-buyers. This framing is problematic for three distinct reasons.
First, the minerals in question are not entering Rwanda through peaceful, regulated trade. Passengers travelling through Kigali International Airport do so voluntarily, with proper documentation, under lawful conditions, and without violence or coercion. By contrast, the minerals flowing from eastern DRC through Rwanda are extracted in areas affected by armed violence, particularly in eastern DRC, where control over mining sites and routes is contested. They arrive through entirely different circumstances: extracted from territories seized by military force, transported under armed guard through zones of active conflict, and laundered into international supply chains through fraudulent certificates of origin.
Second, Rwanda's economic benefit is not incidental, as the airport analogy implies. The country has, over time, reported mineral export volumes that exceed its domestic production capacity, raising persistent questions about provenance. This is not passive transit; it is active participation in a conflict mineral economy that generates substantial revenue for Rwandan actors whilst devastating the country from which the minerals originate.
Third, the analogy minimises the causal link between armed aggression, forced displacement, and mineral flows. By framing minerals as simply "passing through" like airline passengers, Kagame obscures the violence, coercion, and systematic dispossession that enable this flow. The comparison trivialises the fact that these minerals only "transit" through Rwanda because Rwandan-backed forces control the extraction sites, transport routes, and border crossings through military occupation.
However, Kagame's airport analogy inadvertently exposes a more sinister strategic objective. By justifying Rwanda's right to benefit from minerals "transiting" through its territory—essentially admitting to and normalising theft—Kagame reveals that maintaining chaos and dysfunction in eastern DRC serves Rwanda's economic interests. The comparison is particularly revealing: just as Kagame wants minerals to flow through Rwanda for processing and profit, he benefits from eastern DRC having no functioning airport, forcing Congolese residents and international visitors to use Kigali International Airport and RwandAir for travel.
This represents a deliberate strategy of economic subjugation. If eastern DRC has no functioning infrastructure—no operational airports, no reliable electricity, no secure banking system, no stable business environment—then Rwanda positions itself as the indispensable economic gateway and service provider for the entire region. The Goma airport, which served as a crucial humanitarian and commercial hub before M23's capture of the city in January 2025, has been effectively closed, with humanitarian organisations unable to establish the air corridor desperately needed for aid delivery. This dysfunction is not merely a consequence of conflict; it serves Rwanda's strategic interests.
The pattern extends beyond transportation infrastructure. With eastern DRC's economy collapsed, markets disrupted, and local production devastated by displacement and violence, Rwanda becomes the supplier of goods and services to a captive population. Congolese civilians, unable to access basic necessities in their own communities, must rely on Rwandan imports. Businesses that might operate in Goma or Bukavu instead establish themselves in Kigali. Investment that could develop eastern DRC's economy flows to Rwanda instead. In this context, perpetuating instability in DRC is not an unfortunate side effect of Rwanda's security concerns—it is an economic strategy.
When Kagame stated that Rwanda should not simply allow minerals to pass through unprocessed, questioning why developed countries should be the only ones to profit, he omitted the crucial context that these minerals originate from land his country's military forces occupy. Moreover, he revealed that Rwanda's interest extends beyond minerals to comprehensive economic domination of the region. The European Union Parliament, in February 2025, explicitly called for the suspension of the EU Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with Rwanda, specifically citing the export of minerals from M23-controlled areas.
Rwanda's official mineral export figures reveal the scope of the problem. Rwandan coltan exports doubled from approximately 1,000 tonnes in 2021 to 2,000 tonnes in 2023, with 2024 first-quarter exports reaching record highs of over 630 tonnes. UN experts and civil society organisations have consistently noted that Rwanda's mineral export figures do not correspond with its actual domestic production capacity, even before this recent surge. The country has faced accusations of exporting looted and smuggled minerals from DRC for over two decades. Global Witness investigations revealed that major international commodity traders purchased 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024, with significant proportions traced to conflict zones in eastern DRC.
Rwanda's Economic Capture Strategy: Profiting from DRC's Dysfunction
The strategic logic becomes clearer when examining the comprehensive nature of eastern DRC's economic collapse under M23 control. Banks throughout Goma and Bukavu remain closed, leaving the population without access to financial services or their own funds. This forces reliance on informal cross-border money transfers, many channelled through Rwandan financial networks. The World Food Programme reported that the closure of banks has had a devastating impact on livelihoods and food security, creating conditions where external suppliers—primarily from Rwanda—become essential for survival.
Electricity supplies have been cut for extended periods in M23-controlled territories. Water systems have failed, forcing populations to resort to unsafe sources like Lake Kivu, increasing cholera risks. Road networks have been disrupted, with key transport routes controlled by M23 forces. Internet and telecommunications have been severely restricted. Each of these infrastructure failures creates dependency on alternatives, many of which connect through or originate from Rwanda.
The humanitarian crisis itself generates economic opportunities that Rwanda captures. With over 1.6 million people displaced in 2025 alone in eastern DRC, massive populations require food, shelter, medical care, and basic supplies. International humanitarian organisations, unable to operate effectively in M23-controlled areas due to security restrictions and lack of access, often base operations in neighbouring Rwanda, purchasing supplies and services there. Even humanitarian assistance intended for Congolese civilians generates revenue for Rwandan businesses and employment for Rwandan workers.
RwandAir, the national carrier, benefits substantially from this arrangement. Before M23's offensive, Goma International Airport served as a vital hub for eastern DRC, connecting the region to Kinshasa, other African cities, and international destinations. With Goma's airport effectively non-operational for civilian commercial flights since January 2025, travellers from eastern DRC must transit through Kigali. Business people, aid workers, diplomats, journalists, and even Congolese citizens seeking to travel internationally have no alternative but to use Rwandan air services. The airport analogy Kagame employed thus reveals the breadth of his economic vision: just as minerals must transit through Rwanda for processing, people must transit through Kigali for travel.
This dependency extends to goods and services across sectors. With local businesses in Goma and Bukavu unable to operate due to insecurity, looting, and displacement of workforce, consumer goods increasingly come from Rwanda. Agricultural products that eastern DRC once produced are now imported. Construction materials for any rebuilding efforts must be sourced from outside. Professional services—legal, accounting, consulting—relocate to Kigali where security permits normal business operations. The cumulative effect is economic hollowing of eastern DRC, with Rwanda positioned as the sole viable economic centre for the entire Great Lakes region.
The Human Cost of Mineral Theft and Economic Warfare
The mineral extraction fuelling Rwanda's processing ambitions occurs against a backdrop of immense human suffering, whilst the deliberate economic strangulation of eastern DRC compounds this humanitarian catastrophe. The human cost of this system is well documented by humanitarian organisations and experienced daily by civilians in North Kivu, South Kivu, and surrounding provinces. Human Rights Watch documented that M23 forces captured Goma with overwhelming violence, causing nearly 3,000 casualties and forcing tens of thousands from displacement camps with 72-hour evacuation orders in February 2025. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented summary executions of at least 12 people by M23 between 26 and 28 January, alongside conflict-related sexual violence, forced conscription, and forced labour in mining areas.
Lived experience testimonies from displaced Congolese consistently describe a pattern: armed groups arrive, communities are forced out, and mining resumes under new control. Families flee without assets, land is abandoned, and social structures fracture. Sexual violence, forced labour, and intimidation are reported as tools of dominance used to maintain control over mineral-rich territories. The profits generated do not translate into local development or security; instead, they finance continued violence. To treat the resulting mineral flows as a neutral economic activity is to disregard these realities. Economic arguments cannot be detached from the means by which value is extracted.
The systematic nature of the violence suggests objectives beyond military control. In Rubaya, the continent's largest reserve of 3T minerals, armed groups have imposed forced labour on civilian populations in mining operations. Sexual violence has been weaponised to terrorise communities and maintain dominance over territories. Children have been forcibly conscripted into armed groups. These atrocities serve dual purposes: they extract maximum mineral wealth whilst simultaneously destroying the social and economic fabric that might allow eastern DRC to function independently.
The humanitarian infrastructure has collapsed in affected regions. The World Food Programme, facing dramatic funding shortfalls, has been forced to reduce assistance from one million people at the start of 2025 to just 600,000, with projections of further cuts to 300,000 people—merely 10 per cent of the three million in acute need. Without significant additional funding, a complete halt of all emergency food assistance in eastern provinces is projected for March 2026. This impending catastrophe occurs not in a remote, inaccessible region, but in territories rich in valuable minerals generating substantial profits for those controlling the trade.
Medical facilities have become targets in the conflict. UN reports documented 130 patients suspected of belonging to opposing forces being snatched from hospital beds and taken to undisclosed locations in early March 2025. Doctors Without Borders reported bullets piercing operating theatre roofs during surgical procedures. Schools and hospitals in M23-controlled areas such as Minova have been occupied by rebel forces, depriving communities of essential services. The systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure suggests intent to render eastern DRC uninhabitable and economically unviable.
Cholera outbreaks have spread across 17 provinces, with over 41,000 suspected cases and nearly 1,500 deaths since January 2025. Mpox continues to rise, with more than 3,000 suspected cases. An Ebola outbreak was declared in Kasaï Central in October 2025. These epidemics flourish in conditions of displacement, collapsed sanitation systems, and absent healthcare—conditions that Rwanda's strategy perpetuates. The disease burden itself becomes another mechanism of economic capture: populations weakened by illness and malnutrition cannot organise resistance, rebuild communities, or develop independent economic capacity.
International Response and Accountability Failures
The international community has begun taking measures to address the crisis, though critics argue these responses remain insufficient given the scale of suffering and the clarity of evidence regarding Rwanda's role.
Legal and Ethical Dimensions
International law does not prohibit cross-border trade, but it expressly prohibits pillage, aggression, and the financing of armed groups. When a state benefits economically from resources extracted through such means, ethical responsibility arises even if legal liability is contested. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines pillage as a war crime, applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The appropriation of Congolese minerals under conditions of military occupation and armed coercion falls squarely within this definition.
Rwanda's argument that richer countries benefit more from the mineral trade is a moral deflection that fails on ethical grounds. Disproportionate benefit elsewhere does not legitimise participation in an unlawful chain. Ethical trade standards, including OECD due-diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected areas, place obligations on all actors in the supply chain, not only final consumers. These standards require companies and states to identify risks, prevent contributing to conflict, and ensure that mineral revenues do not fund armed groups or human rights violations.
By framing its role as mere transit, Rwanda attempts to position itself outside this chain of responsibility. However, when export volumes consistently exceed domestic production capacity, when minerals flow from territories under military occupation by Rwandan forces, and when the resulting revenues sustain armed groups, the claim of neutrality collapses. Rwanda is not an innocent corridor; it is an active participant whose choices enable and profit from this system.
International Sanctions and Diplomatic Measures In February 2025, the United States Treasury sanctioned two individuals: James Kabarebe, Rwanda's Minister of State for Regional Integration, for orchestrating Rwandan Defence Force support to M23 and managing revenue from illegally occupied mines; and Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston, an M23 senior member, for his role in the conflict. Additional sanctions in August 2025 targeted armed groups and mining companies involved in illegal mineral trade, including entities that sold minerals sourced from controlled areas to Hong Kong-based export companies.
However, these sanctions target individuals and specific entities whilst leaving Rwanda's broader economic relationships intact. European Union members have expressed growing concern, with Belgium blocking renewed funding for Rwandan operations in Mozambique and making it conditional on withdrawal from DRC. Some EU countries have called for suspending development assistance to Rwanda until it withdraws troops and ceases M23 support. Yet the EU-Rwanda strategic partnership on raw materials, signed in February 2024, has remained formally active despite fierce criticism for potentially legitimising minerals smuggled from DRC. This partnership exemplifies the contradictions in international policy: condemning the violence whilst maintaining economic arrangements that incentivise its continuation.
The United States facilitated a peace agreement signed on 27 June 2025 between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and President Kagame, though fighting has continued despite this accord. In August 2025, both countries signed a Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework, committing to eliminate barriers obstructing direct and lawful export of minerals. Critics question whether such frameworks can operate legitimately whilst military occupation continues. More fundamentally, these agreements risk normalising the current situation—treating minerals extracted under military occupation as legitimate objects of regional trade policy rather than proceeds of theft and violence.
The slowness and inadequacy of the international response may have emboldened M23 and its Rwandan backers. Each territorial advance that meets limited consequences signals that further expansion carries acceptable risks. Each month that economic partnerships remain operational despite documented evidence of conflict mineral smuggling demonstrates that commercial interests outweigh humanitarian concerns. The pattern resembles earlier episodes in African resource conflicts where international declarations of concern coexist with continued business relationships with perpetrators.
Development assistance to Rwanda remains substantial despite the overwhelming evidence of its military involvement in DRC. Major donors, including the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States, continue providing hundreds of millions in aid annually. This assistance, even when presumably not directly funding military operations, frees up Rwandan government resources for defence spending. The contrast with 2012 is instructive: when multiple donors suspended aid following UN documentation of Rwandan support for M23, the group was forced to withdraw from Goma. The current reluctance to employ similar leverage suggests either diminished political will or calculation that Rwanda's cooperation on other issues—including hosting refugees, regional security operations, and development partnerships—outweighs concerns about its actions in DRC.
The Moral Imperative for Change
Rwanda's argument that developed countries profit from minerals they do not produce themselves, whilst factually accurate, represents a dangerous moral deflection that obscures uncomfortable truths about Rwanda's own economic reality. The colonial history of resource extraction from Africa by Western powers is indeed deeply problematic and merits continued examination and redress. However, two wrongs do not make a right. The fact that wealthy nations have historically exploited African resources does not justify Rwanda imposing illegal exploitation upon its neighbour through military force. Moreover, Kagame's comparison fundamentally mischaracterises the nature of Rwanda's actions: colonial powers at least nominally purchased African resources, however inequitably; Rwanda is simply taking them through military occupation.
The narrative of Rwandan development that Kagame invokes to justify his country's regional ambitions warrants closer examination. Whilst Kigali presents an impressive facade of modernity—clean streets, new buildings, and functioning infrastructure—this development remains concentrated in the capital city. Rwanda continues to rank among the 25 poorest countries in the world. Beyond Kigali, poverty and malnutrition persist throughout the country, with more than 50 per cent of Rwandans surviving on less than $2 per day. More than 80 per cent of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival, with high unemployment particularly affecting youth. The formal public and private sector labour markets remain tiny, offering limited opportunities for wage employment. This economic reality raises profound questions about who truly benefits from the minerals flowing through Rwanda from eastern DRC.
If Rwanda's exploitation of Congolese resources genuinely served national development and poverty reduction, one might expect to see improvements in living standards across Rwandan society and expansion of employment opportunities. Instead, the concentration of visible development in Kigali whilst the overwhelming majority of Rwandans remain trapped in subsistence agriculture suggests that profits from mineral trade enrich political and economic elites rather than creating jobs or benefiting ordinary citizens. This pattern mirrors precisely the extractive colonial systems Kagame claims to oppose: resources flow from the periphery (eastern DRC) through a processing centre (Kigali) to international markets, with local populations—both Congolese and ordinary Rwandans—bearing the costs whilst a narrow elite captures the benefits.
The failure to translate mineral revenues into genuine economic development, job creation, and reduction in subsistence farming dependency reveals the hollowness of Rwanda's justifications. If controlling mineral flows from eastern DRC truly served national economic transformation, one would expect to see growth in formal employment, diversification beyond agriculture, and improved living standards for rural populations. The absence of these outcomes suggests that the mineral trade serves regime enrichment and projection of international prestige rather than addressing the fundamental economic challenges facing the Rwandan population. Young Rwandans facing unemployment have more to gain from genuine domestic economic development than from their government's military adventures in neighbouring territory.
The fundamental principle at stake is sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Democratic Republic of Congo, despite its governance challenges, remains a sovereign nation with internationally recognised borders. Its mineral wealth belongs to the Congolese people, not to foreign powers—whether historical colonial empires or neighbouring states. When President Kagame dismissed allegations by stating that Rwanda would be "100 times richer" if it were truly stealing Congo's minerals, he presented a false binary. The evidence shows that Rwanda is benefiting substantially from this trade, even if not to the maximum theoretical extent possible. The statement itself reveals troubling logic: that Rwanda's relative poverty somehow justifies theft from an even poorer neighbour.
This logic becomes particularly hollow when examining Rwanda's actual economic conditions. Despite the gleaming development visible in Kigali—the clean streets, modern buildings, and infrastructure improvements that impress international visitors and donors—Rwanda remains among the world's 25 poorest nations. More than half of Rwandans subsist on less than $2 per day, with poverty and malnutrition widespread beyond the capital. If minerals extracted from DRC truly benefited the Rwandan population, these poverty rates would not persist. Instead, the concentration of visible development in Kigali suggests that profits from the mineral trade serve elite enrichment and the projection of international prestige rather than genuine poverty reduction for ordinary Rwandans.
This raises a profound moral question: who benefits from Rwanda's strategy in eastern DRC? Not the Congolese people, who suffer displacement, violence, and theft of their resources. Not ordinary Rwandans, who remain trapped in subsistence agriculture with high unemployment and limited formal sector opportunities despite their government's access to substantial mineral revenues. The primary beneficiaries appear to be Rwanda's political and economic elite, international commodity traders, and foreign technology companies whose supply chains avoid uncomfortable questions about mineral origins. The masses on both sides of the border pay the price whilst a narrow stratum captures the profits.
If mineral revenues genuinely served broad-based development, Rwanda would see expansion of its tiny formal labour market, creation of employment opportunities for its unemployed youth, and reduction in the 80 per cent of the population dependent on subsistence agriculture. The absence of these outcomes, despite decades of mineral flows through Rwanda, demonstrates that the wealth generated does not translate into jobs, wages, or improved livelihoods for ordinary citizens. Instead, it funds the projection of power, enriches connected elites, and builds monuments to development in Kigali that mask the reality of most Rwandans' lives.
Jean-Pierre Okenda, director of the DRC-based NGO Sentinel Natural Resources, argues that Kagame's long-term goal is to maintain influence over political decision-making in eastern DRC whilst retaining security and economic control of the Kivu provinces. Okenda suggests that Rwanda appears prepared for a prolonged occupation, with M23 establishing governance systems in controlled territories. The combination of military control, administrative structures, systematic mineral extraction, and deliberate economic strangulation suggests not temporary security operations but territorial annexation in all but name. The airport analogy becomes particularly chilling in this context: Kagame envisions a permanent arrangement where eastern DRC's resources, people, and commerce flow through Rwanda indefinitely.
This strategy carries implications beyond DRC and Rwanda. If successful, it establishes a precedent that militarily stronger African nations can occupy weaker neighbours' resource-rich territories under security pretexts, extract wealth, and destroy local economic capacity to ensure permanent dependency. This represents a new form of colonialism—not by distant European powers, but by African neighbours. The international community's tolerance of this arrangement, evidenced by continued economic partnerships and inadequate pressure on Rwanda, risks normalising such behaviour and encouraging replication elsewhere on the continent.
Challenges Facing the DRC
It would be incomplete to examine this crisis without acknowledging the significant governance challenges within the Democratic Republic of Congo itself. The DRC has struggled with weak state capacity, corruption, and the presence of numerous armed groups for decades. The Congolese government's inability to establish effective control over its eastern territories has created conditions that neighbouring powers have exploited. The presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia composed of remnants from the 1994 Rwandan genocide, does represent a legitimate security concern for Rwanda.
However, Rwanda's response—supporting a rebel group that has displaced millions and caused thousands of deaths—far exceeds any proportionate security measure. The structural weakness of DRC military forces and governance does not grant Rwanda the right to occupy Congolese territory or appropriate its resources. International law provides mechanisms for addressing cross-border security threats that do not involve territorial invasion and resource theft. Rwanda could have pursued diplomatic solutions, regional security cooperation frameworks, or legitimate peacekeeping arrangements through regional organisations or the United Nations.
Moreover, Rwanda's actions actively undermine prospects for improved governance in eastern DRC. By destroying infrastructure, displacing populations, disrupting economic activity, and maintaining conditions of permanent crisis, Rwanda ensures that Congolese authorities cannot establish effective administration. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle: DRC's weakness justifies Rwandan intervention, which perpetuates DRC's weakness, which justifies continued intervention. Breaking this cycle requires Rwanda to cease activities that prevent eastern DRC from achieving stability and begin supporting, rather than sabotaging, Congolese capacity-building efforts.
Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Transformation
The Great Lakes region faces genuine structural challenges that warrant acknowledgement. Borders are porous, economies are interlinked, and widespread poverty creates incentives for informal and illicit trade. Rwanda seeks economic growth and stability in a difficult neighbourhood where state fragility, armed groups, and historical grievances complicate regional cooperation. These realities cannot be ignored in crafting solutions.
However, alongside these challenges lie significant opportunities currently being squandered. Transparent, jointly regulated mineral trade between Rwanda and the DRC could generate substantial lawful revenue for both countries, reduce incentives for armed control of mining sites, rebuild trust between governments, and demonstrate regional leadership in conflict-sensitive resource governance. Such cooperation would require fundamental shifts in approach: Rwanda would need to clearly and verifiably distance itself from conflict-linked supply chains, support Congolese sovereignty rather than undermining it, and accept international monitoring of mineral flows.
Regional mechanisms for mineral certification already exist in nascent form but require political will to strengthen and enforce. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) established the Regional Certification Mechanism for conflict minerals, yet implementation remains weak when powerful actors benefit from opacity. Enhanced customs cooperation, joint border management, and transparent revenue-sharing arrangements could transform adversarial relationships into partnerships for mutual benefit.
Most importantly, the narrative must change. Comparing conflict minerals to airport transit trivialises violence and obscures responsibility. Acknowledging harm is the first step towards reform. Rwanda could emerge as a leader in ethical mineral sourcing rather than remaining tainted by association with conflict resources. This choice requires courage to prioritise long-term regional stability over short-term economic gains from illicit flows.
Future Trends and Outlook
Global scrutiny of mineral supply chains is intensifying dramatically, creating both risks and opportunities for the Great Lakes region. Legislation in Europe, including the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, and evolving standards in North America increasingly target conflict minerals and corporate complicity in human rights violations. Supply chain due diligence is shifting from voluntary best practice to legal obligation, with potential criminal and civil liability for companies sourcing minerals linked to armed conflict.
Rwanda's current position risks severe reputational damage and escalating economic consequences as international buyers demand stricter compliance and verifiable conflict-free sourcing. Technology companies, automobile manufacturers, and electronics producers face mounting pressure from consumers, investors, and regulators to ensure their supply chains do not fund violence. Several major corporations have already faced legal challenges over alleged use of conflict minerals, prompting industry-wide reassessment of sourcing practices.
This evolving landscape presents a stark choice for Rwanda. Continuing current practices risks isolation from legitimate markets as verification requirements tighten and reputational costs mount. Conversely, leadership in ethical sourcing and transparent mineral governance could position Rwanda and the broader Great Lakes region as a model for post-conflict resource management, attracting premium buyers willing to pay for verified conflict-free minerals and opening pathways to value-added processing built on legitimate foundations.
The economic calculus is shifting decisively against opaque conflict-linked mineral flows. Short-term gains from current arrangements will increasingly be outweighed by long-term costs in market access, international reputation, and regional stability. The question is whether Rwanda will adapt proactively or wait until external pressure forces change under less favourable terms.
The Path Forward: From Conflict to Cooperation
Addressing this crisis requires multifaceted approaches that recognise both immediate humanitarian needs and longer-term political solutions. A viable alternative to the current system exists, but implementing it demands political will and fundamental changes in approach.
Immediate Humanitarian Priorities
The immediate priority must be protecting civilian populations and restoring humanitarian access to affected areas. The World Food Programme has called for $350 million to provide emergency food and nutrition assistance over six months. International donors must provide this funding urgently to prevent the projected complete collapse of food assistance by March 2026. However, humanitarian aid alone cannot address a crisis rooted in deliberate military and economic strategy. Political solutions must accompany humanitarian relief.
Alternative Pathways for Legitimate Mineral Trade
Rwanda could publicly commit to refusing minerals whose provenance cannot be independently verified as conflict-free. This would require establishing robust verification systems, accepting international monitoring, and demonstrating through transparent reporting that export volumes align with legitimate sources. Regional mechanisms could be strengthened to certify origin through the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region's certification framework, ensuring revenues benefit local communities rather than armed groups.
International partners could support infrastructure development and customs cooperation rather than tolerating ambiguity. Investment in formal cross-border trade facilities, joint monitoring posts, and transparent revenue-sharing arrangements would create alternatives to current illicit flows. Technical assistance for traceability systems, from mine to market, would enable legitimate actors to compete whilst marginalising conflict-linked suppliers.
Increasing International Pressure
International pressure on Rwanda must increase substantially and take forms that genuinely affect decision-making calculations. Whilst sanctions represent important symbolic and practical measures, development assistance cuts proven effective in 2012—when M23 was previously forced to leave Goma—should be seriously considered and implemented. European Union nations and other major donors collectively provide substantial assistance to Rwanda, offering considerable leverage if applied with unified political will. The EU's consideration of suspending its raw materials partnership with Rwanda represents a positive step that must be implemented immediately, not merely discussed. Economic partnerships that incentivise conflict mineral trade cannot coexist with policies claiming to promote peace and human rights.
Supply chain transparency and accountability mechanisms require urgent strengthening and rigorous enforcement. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which Rwanda does not currently participate in, should become a precondition for any mineral trade agreements with international partners. Technology companies purchasing minerals for electronics manufacturing must implement more rigorous due diligence to ensure their supply chains are not funding conflict. Several companies, including Apple, have faced legal action over alleged use of conflict minerals, prompting some to instruct suppliers to cease purchases from Rwanda and DRC entirely. However, such blanket prohibitions may unfairly penalise legitimate Congolese miners whilst doing little to stop illegal trade through Rwanda.
More effective approaches would combine supply chain verification with targeted sanctions against specific mines, trading companies, and processing facilities documented as handling conflict minerals. International buyers should be required to demonstrate not merely that minerals do not originate from conflict zones, but that their suppliers have robust verification systems preventing contamination of supply chains with illegally sourced materials. The technology exists to trace mineral origins through chemical fingerprinting and blockchain-based tracking systems; what lacks is political will to mandate their implementation.
Regional economic integration frameworks, whilst potentially beneficial in stable conditions, cannot function legitimately whilst military occupation continues. The Regional Economic Integration Framework signed in August 2025 risks legitimising the current situation rather than transforming it. Peace must precede economic integration, not follow it. Any regional trade agreements must include mechanisms ensuring that minerals originate from territories under legitimate governmental control, are extracted under lawful conditions, and generate revenue for affected communities rather than armed groups.
The Democratic Republic of Congo requires substantial support to strengthen its governance capacity and security forces. However, this support must be carefully designed to avoid inadvertently fuelling conflict or enabling human rights abuses by Congolese forces themselves. The United States proposal for a minerals-for-security deal, similar to arrangements discussed with Ukraine, carries significant risks. Such arrangements could legitimise external control over DRC's resources whilst failing to address the fundamental sovereignty violations Rwanda has committed. Any security assistance must be coupled with genuine respect for Congolese territorial integrity and resources ownership.
Conclusion
Rwanda's international reputation for development and progress since the 1994 genocide masks a more troubling reality. Whilst Kigali presents an image of modernity and economic advancement that has earned international praise, Rwanda remains among the 25 poorest countries in the world. Beyond the capital, poverty and malnutrition persist across much of the country, with more than 50 per cent of Rwandans earning less than $2 per day. This economic desperation, far from justifying Rwanda's actions in DRC, makes them more morally reprehensible: a nation whose own people suffer widespread poverty is stealing resources from an even poorer neighbour rather than addressing its domestic challenges through legitimate development.
Rwanda got it wrong by framing conflict-driven mineral flows as normal trade. The issue is not cross-border commerce itself, which can and should benefit neighbouring nations, but the coercive conditions under which minerals are extracted from the DRC and channelled through Rwanda. This system is imposed by war, sustained by aggression, and paid for by displaced civilians. Calling this "trade" sanitises what is, in effect, the appropriation of resources during conflict, shifting attention away from how the trade is imposed and towards who ultimately profits, thereby diluting accountability at the regional level.
President Kagame's statements at Umushyikirano 2026 revealed a troubling willingness to normalise what amounts to systematic theft under cover of legitimate trade discourse, whilst inadvertently exposing a comprehensive strategy of economic subjugation designed to ensure eastern DRC's permanent dependency on Rwanda. Comparing conflict minerals to airport transit trivialises violence and obscures responsibility. The concentration of Rwanda's apparent development in Kigali, built partially on profits from Congolese minerals whilst Rwandan citizens outside the capital remain impoverished, demonstrates that this strategy serves elite interests rather than genuine national development.
The minerals flowing through Rwanda are not innocent passengers transiting an airport. They are the proceeds of military aggression, extracted through violence and suffering imposed on millions of Congolese civilians. The airport analogy itself reveals the breadth of Rwanda's ambitions: just as minerals must transit through Rwanda for processing, Kagame ensures that people must transit through Kigali for travel, businesses must operate from Rwanda for security, and goods must flow through Rwandan supply chains because eastern DRC's economy has been systematically destroyed.
Rwanda got it wrong by conflating historical injustices against Africa with its own actions in eastern Congo, by prioritising economic gain over regional peace, by attempting to present conflict minerals as legitimate trade, and by pursuing a deliberate strategy of maintaining chaos in neighbouring territory to capture its economic opportunities. The international community has compounded this error by maintaining economic partnerships that reward this behaviour whilst offering only symbolic condemnations of the violence.
The Congolese people have the right to their own resources, peace, security, and economic development. Until Rwanda withdraws its forces, ceases supporting armed groups in DRC, and abandons its strategy of profiting from Congolese dysfunction, the blood of thousands and the suffering of millions will remain the true price of the minerals passing through Kigali. More broadly, until the international community demonstrates that military occupation and resource theft carry consequences that outweigh benefits, similar strategies will proliferate across Africa and beyond. The crisis in eastern DRC is thus not merely a regional conflict but a test of whether the international system can uphold basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity against economically motivated aggression.
The tragedy is compounded by the reality that this exploitation serves elite interests on both sides rather than genuine development. Ordinary Rwandans, more than half surviving on less than $2 per day, see little benefit from minerals stolen from their Congolese neighbours. Over 80 per cent of Rwandans remain dependent on subsistence agriculture, with high youth unemployment and a tiny formal labour market offering limited opportunities for wage employment. If mineral revenues genuinely served national development, one would expect job creation, agricultural modernisation, and expanded employment opportunities. Instead, the gleaming towers of Kigali, built partially on profits from conflict minerals whilst rural Rwandans cultivate small plots for survival and millions of Congolese suffer, stand as monuments not to development but to a new form of extractive colonialism—African elites exploiting African masses using the same mechanisms that historical colonial powers employed.
The choice facing the international community is clear: continue enabling Rwanda's economic capture strategy through maintained partnerships and inadequate pressure, or impose meaningful consequences that alter Rwanda's cost-benefit calculations. History will judge not only Rwanda's actions but the response—or lack thereof—from nations and institutions claiming to uphold international law, human rights, and African development. The Congolese people, displaced, starving, and dying in the millions, deserve better than expressions of concern accompanied by business as usual. So too do ordinary Rwandans, whose poverty persists, whose youth face unemployment, and whose overwhelming dependence on subsistence agriculture continues whilst their government prioritises mineral theft and military adventures over domestic economic development and job creation.
Normalising conflict-driven resource extraction compounds injustice and perpetuates suffering. Ending it requires honesty about causes, acknowledgement of harm, accountability for actions, and a commitment to lawful, sovereign, and humane economic relations in the Great Lakes region. The alternative pathways exist; what lacks is the political will to pursue them. Rwanda could emerge as a regional leader in ethical mineral governance, or it could continue down a path that brings short-term gains at the cost of long-term isolation and regional instability. The choice is Rwanda's to make, but the international community must ensure that choice carries real consequences.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is M23 and what is its connection to Rwanda?
M23 (March 23 Movement) is a rebel group formed in 2012 by former Congolese soldiers, primarily from the Tutsi ethnic group. United Nations experts and multiple governments have documented that Rwanda provides military support to M23, with between 7,000 and 12,000 Rwandan Defence Force troops fighting alongside the group. Rwanda officially denies these allegations, though Kagame has acknowledged Rwandan security interests in eastern DRC.
Is cross-border trade between Rwanda and the DRC illegal?
No. Lawful, consensual trade between neighbouring countries is legal and can be economically beneficial. The problem arises when trade is driven by conflict, coercion, and loss of Congolese sovereign control over resources. The current mineral flows fail the tests of sovereignty, consent, and legality that define legitimate commerce.
Why are Rwanda's mineral exports questioned?
Because Rwanda's reported export volumes have consistently exceeded its domestic production capacity, raising persistent questions about external sourcing and provenance. UN experts and civil society organisations have documented that these excess exports correlate with minerals smuggled from conflict zones in eastern DRC.
How many people have been affected by the conflict in eastern DRC?
Over 7.3 million people are internally displaced across DRC, with 5.2 million displaced specifically in eastern regions. At least 15,000 civilians have been killed since January 2025, and approximately 26.6 million Congolese face acute food insecurity. The crisis represents one of the world's largest displacement situations and the highest number of people requiring humanitarian assistance globally.
What minerals are being smuggled from DRC through Rwanda?
The primary minerals involved are the so-called "3T" minerals: tin, tungsten, and tantalum (processed from coltan), along with gold. These minerals are essential for electronics manufacturing, including mobile phones, computers, and electric vehicles. Rubaya in eastern DRC produces approximately 15 per cent of the world's tantalum supply. UN experts documented this as the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the African Great Lakes Region in the past decade.
Why does Rwanda benefit from chaos in eastern DRC?
Maintaining dysfunction in eastern DRC serves multiple Rwandan economic interests: minerals flow through Rwanda for processing and export; without functioning airports in eastern DRC, travellers must use Kigali International Airport and RwandAir; collapsed Congolese businesses create markets for Rwandan goods and services; and prevented economic development ensures eastern DRC remains dependent on Rwanda as the regional economic hub rather than becoming a competitor.
Who benefits most from the illicit mineral trade?
Global buyers in wealthy countries capture significant value through processing and manufacturing, but this does not absolve regional actors of responsibility. Rwanda's political and economic elite, international commodity traders, and foreign technology companies all benefit financially, creating shared responsibility across the supply chain. Ordinary Rwandans remain trapped in poverty whilst Congolese people suffer displacement and theft of their resources.
What is the impact on civilians in eastern DRC?
Displacement, often repeatedly as fighting erupts around mineral-rich zones, human rights abuses including sexual violence and forced labour, destruction of livelihoods and social structures, and prolonged insecurity are direct consequences linked to control of mineral areas. Lived experience testimonies consistently describe armed groups arriving, communities being forced out, and mining resuming under new control.
What has the international community done to address this crisis?
The United States has imposed sanctions on Rwandan officials and entities involved in the conflict and mineral trade. The European Union Parliament has called for suspending the EU-Rwanda raw materials partnership. However, critics argue these measures remain insufficient. Major development assistance to Rwanda continues, economic partnerships remain largely intact, and pressure has proven inadequate to alter Rwanda's strategic calculations.
Is Rwanda actually a developed country as often portrayed?
No. Despite the impressive development visible in Kigali, which has earned international praise, Rwanda remains among the 25 poorest countries in the world. More than 50 per cent of Rwandans survive on less than $2 per day. Over 80 per cent of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival. High unemployment affects the population, particularly youth, with the formal public and private sector labour markets remaining tiny. Development and modernity are concentrated in the capital city, whilst poverty, malnutrition, and limited employment opportunities persist throughout rural areas.
What would a solution look like?
A viable solution would include: verified conflict-free sourcing with independent monitoring; respect for Congolese sovereignty over its resources; regional cooperation through strengthened certification mechanisms; enforcement of international due-diligence standards across the supply chain; transparent revenue-sharing that benefits local communities; and infrastructure investment in legitimate cross-border trade facilities. Most fundamentally, it requires Rwanda to publicly commit to refusing minerals whose provenance cannot be independently verified as conflict-free.
Meta Information
Meta Title: How Rwanda Got It Wrong: Economic Subjugation Through Congo Conflict
Meta Description: Analysis of Rwanda's comprehensive strategy revealed through Kagame's airport analogy—how maintaining chaos in DRC serves Rwanda's economic interests by capturing minerals, transport, trade, and regional dominance whilst millions suffer humanitarian catastrophe.
Meta Keywords: Rwanda, DRC, Congo, conflict minerals, M23, Paul Kagame, economic warfare, coltan, tantalum, humanitarian crisis, mineral smuggling, Goma airport, Kigali, Rubaya, Kivu provinces, Umushyikirano, regional economic capture, infrastructure destruction
References
ACAPS (2025) Crisis & humanitarian needs in DRC. Available at: https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/drc (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Al Jazeera (2025) Mapping the human toll of the conflict in DR Congo, 24 March. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/24/mapping-the-human-toll-of-the-conflict-in-dr-congo (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Al Jazeera (2025) Why does DRC want a Ukraine-like minerals deal with Trump, amid conflict?, 17 March. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/amid-conflict-why-does-the-drc-want-a-minerals-deal-with-trump (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
AllAfrica (2026) Rwanda: Kagame Dismisses Concerns That Rwanda Processes Minerals From DR Congo, 6 February. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202602060062.html (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Autesserre, S. (2010) The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Corus International (2025) Humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC: Addressing rising displacement and critical needs in Goma and beyond. Available at: https://corusinternational.org/blog/2025/humanitarian-crisis-eastern-drc-addressing-rising-displacement-and-critical-needs-goma (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Displacement Tracking Matrix (2025) Violence and Crisis — Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available at: https://dtm.iom.int/dtm-insights/april-2025-edition/data-update-violence-and-crisis-democratic-republic-congo (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Egmont Institute (2024) What does Rwanda want in the DRC?, 18 July. Available at: https://www.egmontinstitute.be/what-does-rwanda-want-in-the-drc/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
European Parliament (2025) EU parliament calls for end to Rwanda mineral pact over DRC conflict links, 27 February. Available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2025/02/eu-parliament-calls-for-end-to-rwanda-mineral-pact-over-drc-conflict-links/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Geopolitical Monitor (2025) M23, Minerals, and Geopolitics in Eastern DRC, 12 November. Available at: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/m23-minerals-and-geopolitics-in-eastern-drc/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Global Witness (2022) Rwanda's Role in the Trade of Conflict Minerals. London: Global Witness.
Global Witness (2024) New investigation suggests EU trader Traxys buys conflict minerals from DRC. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Human Rights Watch (2026) World Report 2026: Democratic Republic of Congo. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/democratic-republic-of-congo (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
KT Press (2026) 'Rwanda Would Be 100 Times Richer If Stealing Congo Minerals' – Kagame, 5 February. Available at: https://www.ktpress.rw/2026/02/rwanda-would-be-100-times-richer-if-stealing-congo-minerals-kagame/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
KT Press (2026) UMUSHYIKIRANO 2026: Insights From Day 1, 7 February. Available at: https://www.ktpress.rw/2026/02/umushyikirano-2026-insights-from-day-1/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Mail & Guardian (2026) We could be 100 times richer: Kagame on allegations of exploiting DRC, 8 February. Available at: https://mg.co.za/africa/2026-02-06-we-could-be-100-times-richer-kagame-on-allegations-of-exploiting-drc/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Mongabay (2025) How illicit mining fuels violence in eastern DRC: Interview with Jean-Pierre Okenda, 25 February. Available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2025/02/how-illicit-mining-fuels-violence-in-eastern-drc-interview-with-jean-pierre-okenda/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Oakland Institute (2025) Shafted: The Scramble for Critical Minerals in the DRC. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/shafted-scramble-for-critical-minerals-drc.pdf (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
OECD (2016) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OHCHR (2025) DRC: Deepening human rights crisis amid reports of further M23 advances. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/01/drc-deepening-human-rights-crisis-amid-reports-further-m23-advances (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Think Global Health (2025) DRC in Crisis: The Human Cost of U.S. Aid Cuts Amid the M23 Rebellion. Available at: https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/drc-crisis-human-cost-us-aid-cuts-amid-m23-rebellion (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
UN News (2025) DR Congo hunger crisis worsening amid fighting and lack of aid funding, 7 November. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166305 (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
UNOCHA (2025) Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available at: https://www.unocha.org/democratic-republic-congo (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC (various years) Final Reports. New York: United Nations.
US Department of the Treasury (2025) Treasury Sanctions Entities Linked to Violence and Illegal Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 August. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0221 (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
World Relief (2026) The Stars Shine Brightest in Eastern DRC. Available at: https://worldrelief.org/blog-drc-conflict/ (Accessed: 9 February 2026).
Author: International Affairs and Conflict Analysis Specialist
Comments
Post a Comment