Burundi: An Indispensable Actor in the Quest for Peace in the Great Lakes Region – Analysis of a Major Diplomatic Turning Point

Introduction

Burundi's official invitation to participate in the signing of the Washington Accords between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), scheduled for 4 December 2025, marks a diplomatic turning point whose significance extends far beyond the symbolic (Mwangi, 2025). This event represents not only international recognition of Burundi's stabilising role, but also a strategic repositioning within the complex geopolitics of the Great Lakes region. Long marginalised or underestimated, Burundi is now emerging as a central actor in the search for lasting peace in a region marked by decades of conflict, foreign interference, forced displacement and geopolitical rivalries.

International Recognition of Burundi's Role

Burundi's invitation to a bilateral agreement between Rwanda and the DRC constitutes an exception in diplomatic practice. Ordinarily, such negotiations are conducted behind closed doors, between the two directly concerned states and mediating powers. The fact that Burundi has been invited alongside Kenyan President William Ruto demonstrates that its diplomatic position has been strengthened to the point of being perceived as a guarantee of stability and credibility (Odongo, 2025). International partners now recognise that any lasting solution to the crises in eastern DRC must necessarily include Burundi.

This recognition is the fruit of the Burundian government's consistent commitment to regional security. Burundi deployed troops to eastern DRC as part of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in March 2023, demonstrating its capacity to intervene in a disciplined and professional manner (East African Community, 2023). Regional partners consider the Burundian army, strengthened by its international experience gained notably in Somalia under AMISOM, to be one of the best prepared in the fight against armed groups, particularly in difficult areas such as South Kivu (Maina, 2023).

Burundi as a Natural Mediator in a Deeply Rooted Crisis

The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be reduced to a simple military confrontation; it forms part of a complex historical configuration involving border issues, ethnic rivalries, illegal exploitation of natural resources, geopolitical ambitions and the involvement of foreign actors. The current conflict, marked by the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23) since 2021, experienced dramatic escalation in January 2025 with the rebel capture of Goma and Bukavu, supported according to UN reports by thousands of Rwandan soldiers (Wikipedia, 2025a).

Burundi, unlike other states in the region, has no expansionist ambitions nor direct economic interests in the conflict. This neutrality confers a major diplomatic advantage: being perceived as a credible mediator, capable of listening, reassuring and bringing positions closer together. Over the years, Bujumbura has strengthened its relations with both Kinshasa and Kigali, whilst preserving its strategic independence.

An Indispensable Military Presence in the Future Regional Order

An Operational and Respected Army

The Burundian National Defence Forces (FDNB) have deployed between 8,000 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC, distributed across sixteen battalions operating primarily in South Kivu (African Security Analysis, 2025). Their presence has proved decisive in stabilising the region, particularly against M23's advance. Unlike other foreign forces operating in the DRC, the Burundian army enjoys a largely positive perception amongst local populations and Congolese authorities, being considered disciplined, effective and faithful to its security mandate (SOS Médias Burundi, 2025).

This military effectiveness has made Burundi indispensable in the current security dynamic. Burundian forces have contributed to blocking the advance of violent rebel movements, securing key border areas, supporting the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) in recapturing strategic localities, and reducing attacks against civilian populations. Without the Burundian presence, the security equation in South Kivu would be considerably more unstable.

A Pragmatic and Clear Foreign Policy

Unlike other governments in the region, often criticised for their interference or opaque agendas, Burundi has adopted a diplomacy of transparency, dialogue and non-aggression. This positioning reassures international partners who see Burundi as a stability factor rather than a source of tension. Burundi is one of the few countries in the region to be accused neither of pillaging Congolese natural resources nor of supporting rebel groups operating against its neighbours.

A Unique Capacity to Engage with All Actors

Burundi maintains contacts with various communities, governments and regional organisations, enabling it to play a bridging role. Its detailed knowledge of the region's politico-ethnic dynamics also enables it to intervene where other countries would be perceived as biased. This balanced position explains why the United States, as organisers of the Washington Accords, deemed it essential to invite Burundi to this historic signing.

4 December 2025: A Symbolic Date for Burundian Diplomacy

When the Washington Accords signing ceremony takes place on 4 December 2025, it will not merely be a protocol gesture. The Washington Accords, initially signed by foreign ministers in June 2025, aim for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern DRC and the Congolese government's eradication of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militia, whilst establishing a framework for regional economic integration based on critical minerals trade (Wikipedia, 2025b).

This will be a moment of international validation of Burundi's role in regional stabilisation. Its presence will confirm that it is no longer a mere observer of Great Lakes region dynamics, but a guarantor and key partner in developing lasting solutions. Burundi will also be able to defend its vision of inclusive peace, based on combating foreign interference, strengthening national capacities, regional cooperation and protecting civilian populations.

Burundi's Security Concerns Regarding Regional Ambitions

Beyond its commitment to regional stability, Burundi also acts out of concern for its own national security. In Bujumbura, numerous political and military officials believe that if Rwanda succeeds in consolidating its influence or controlling the entire Kivu region, this could create a major strategic imbalance on Burundi's borders.

In Burundian security circles, the dominant analysis is clear: if Rwanda extends its military and political control over eastern DRC, it will possess strategic depth enabling it to exert direct pressure on Burundi, or even threaten its stability. Kivu would then become a rear base for projecting influence, weakening Burundian positions or supporting groups hostile to Bujumbura's government.

The RED-Tabara Question and Tensions with Rwanda

Burundi considers that the RED-Tabara armed group (Resistance for Rule of Law in Burundi) was created, supported and used by Rwanda as an instrument of destabilisation against its government. Created in 2015 following a failed military coup, RED-Tabara is estimated to have between 500 and 800 fighters operating from South Kivu in the DRC (Hajayandi, 2024).

This conviction is based on numerous elements identified by Burundian security services over the years, notably repeated attacks launched from Rwandan territory and the presumed training of fighters inside Rwanda. UN Group of Experts reports confirmed in 2016 that captured RED-Tabara members stated they had been recruited in refugee camps in Rwanda and trained by people in Rwandan military uniforms (Hajayandi, 2024).

RED-Tabara attacks have intensified since late 2023, notably the deadly Gatumba attack in December 2023 which killed at least 20 people. In response to these events, President Évariste Ndayishimiye accused Rwanda of financing and training RED-Tabara rebels (VOA News, 2023). Consequently, and faced with the progressive deterioration of bilateral relations, the border between Burundi and Rwanda has been closed since January 2024, illustrating the extreme level of mistrust between the two countries (The East African, 2024).

This closure also constitutes a protective measure for Burundi, which seeks to prevent infiltrations by armed groups capable of threatening its internal stability. Rwanda's alleged support for RED-Tabara can be interpreted as an effort to undermine Burundi's military support to the DRC in its struggle against M23 (Hajayandi, 2024).

A New Chapter for the Great Lakes Region

Burundi's invitation to participate in the Washington Accords marks a genuine shift in regional balance. For a long time, the Rwanda-Uganda axis dominated the politico-military scene in the Great Lakes. Today, a new actor – Burundi – is asserting itself with growing influence, responsible diplomacy and a capacity to inspire confidence.

This repositioning could contribute to building a new regional order, founded on cooperation rather than confrontation, and on solidarity rather than competition. Burundi now represents a model of political and diplomatic resilience, capable of transforming its own complex past into a force for regional stability.

The signing of the Washington Accords on 4 December 2025, in the presence of Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye alongside his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame and Congolese counterpart Félix Tshisekedi, symbolises this new geopolitical reality. It enshrines Burundi's role not only as a stabilising military force on the ground, but also as an indispensable diplomatic partner in building lasting peace in the Great Lakes region.

Conclusion

Burundi's invitation to the Washington Accords of 4 December 2025 reflects a profound transformation of the geopolitical landscape in the Great Lakes region. This international recognition rests on three fundamental pillars: a professional and respected army, pragmatic and balanced diplomacy, and concrete commitment to regional security without an expansionist agenda.

Burundi now appears as an indispensable actor whose military presence in South Kivu has contributed to stabilising a critical security situation. Its capacity to maintain relations with all regional actors, whilst preserving its strategic independence, makes it a credible mediator in a conflict where geopolitical, economic and ethnic interests intertwine in complex ways.

In a context where M23, supported by Rwanda according to UN reports, now controls extensive territories including Goma and Bukavu, and where more than 6.7 million people have been displaced, Burundi's stabilising role becomes all the more crucial. The Washington Accords, which aim to end decades of conflict in eastern DRC, cannot ignore an actor who contributes concretely to reducing violence on the ground.

History may remember 4 December 2025 as the day when Burundi moved from a marginal position to that of a central actor in the Great Lakes peace architecture. This evolution demonstrates a country's capacity to transform its internal challenges into diplomatic opportunities and to establish itself as a stabilising force in one of Africa's most complex regions.

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References

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