Why Didn't the DRC Know It Had the Right to Defend Itself?

And Why Did the United States Have to Remind the UN Security Council?

At the latest United Nations Security Council meeting on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a statement from the United States surprised many observers: Washington reminded that the DRC has full right to defend itself, including by receiving military assistance from Burundi or other partner countries.[1]

This statement, though consistent with international law, raises a fundamental and troubling question: why did the DRC seem to hesitate, or even ignore, this elementary right to self-defence?

This situation is neither trivial nor purely diplomatic. It reveals deep flaws in the DRC's political, legal and diplomatic strategy in the face of persistent aggression in the east of the country.

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1. The Right to Self-Defence: A Fundamental Principle of International Law

International law is clear.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognises the inherent right of every Member State to individual or collective self-defence in the event of armed attack.[2]

For several years now, and particularly with the resurgence of the M23 supported by Rwanda, the DRC has been confronted with:

• occupation of portions of its territory,
• repeated armed attacks,
• documented violations of its sovereignty,
• and crimes against civilians.

Numerous reports by the UN Group of Experts have established Rwanda's direct or indirect involvement in providing logistical, military and strategic support to the M23.[3][4] Legally, these facts are sufficient to characterise an armed attack, fully opening the right to self-defence.

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2. A DRC Trapped in a Posture of Excessive Restraint

Despite this, the DRC has long adopted a posture of restraint, even strategic passivity, for several reasons:

a) Fear of Being Accused of Escalation

Congolese authorities have often feared that by clearly invoking self-defence or openly seeking regional military assistance, they would be accused of militarising the conflict or destabilising the Great Lakes region.

b) International Diplomatic Pressure

For years, the DRC has been encouraged to prioritise:

• dialogue,
• ceasefires,
• the Nairobi, Luanda or Doha processes,[5]

at the expense of firmly asserting its sovereign rights.

These processes have often placed the DRC and the aggressor on artificial equal footing, as if it were an internal or symmetrical conflict, when the facts demonstrate external aggression.

c) Confusion Maintained Around the FDLR Narrative

Rwanda has constantly justified its actions by the alleged presence of the FDLR.[6]

This narrative has long paralysed Congolese diplomacy, even though:

• the FDLR no longer constitute a structured military threat,
• their capabilities are limited,
• and no credible link has been established between the Congolese state and any project of aggression against Rwanda.

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3. Why Did the United States Have to Remind the DRC of This Right?

The American statement at the Security Council is not trivial. It responds to several observations:

a) A DRC Too Defensive on Legal Grounds

The DRC has not sufficiently legalised the conflict.

Instead of systematically invoking:

• the violation of its sovereignty,
• armed aggression,
• and the right to collective defence,

it has often contented itself with political appeals for peace, leaving the field open to biased interpretations.

b) An Sometimes Ambiguous International Community

Faced with this Congolese ambiguity, some Security Council members have maintained false neutrality, calling on "all parties" to exercise restraint, including the victim.

The United States, by explicitly recalling the DRC's right to be assisted by Burundi or other countries, corrected this drift and reaffirmed an essential principle: the victim of aggression does not have to justify defending itself.

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4. The Case of Burundi and Regional Military Assistance

The American reminder is also important on another point: the legality of foreign military assistance to the DRC.

Contrary to the narrative often used against Kinshasa:

• military aid from Burundi,
• or other states invited by the DRC,

constitutes neither an occupation nor aggression, but assistance at the request of a sovereign state, which is perfectly legal under international law.[7]

The difference is fundamental:

• Rwanda operates without invitation, in violation of Congolese territory.
• Burundi acts at the official request of Kinshasa.

Equating the two situations reflects either legal ignorance or political bad faith.

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5. A Strategic Lesson for the DRC

The US reminder must be understood as a diplomatic alarm signal for the DRC.

a) Fully Assume Its Status as Victim of Aggression

The DRC must stop presenting itself as one party among others in a vague regional conflict. It is an attacked state, and must use this status strategically.

b) Anchor Its Communication in International Law

Every official statement should recall:

• Article 51 of the UN Charter,
• expert reports,
• Rwanda's documented violations.

c) End the Diplomacy of Confusion

Accepting ceasefires after each territory seized by the M23 weakens the Congolese position and normalises occupation. Peace cannot be negotiated at the price of sovereignty.

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Conclusion

If the United States had to publicly remind that the DRC has the right to defend itself and receive military assistance, it is because the DRC itself has not always assumed this right with clarity, consistency and firmness.

This situation does not stem from a lack of rights, but from a deficit in legal and diplomatic strategy.

Self-defence is neither a favour nor an exception: it is a fundamental right.

At a time when eastern DRC continues to suffer, full recognition of this right must become a central pillar of Congolese policy, without complexity and without ambiguity.

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Why Did the DRC Seem to Ignore This Right While Rwanda Intimidates, Provokes and Maintains a Bullying Discourse on the DRC and Burundi?

The current situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlights a worrying paradox: whilst Rwanda practises permanent intimidation, maintains a discourse of diplomatic and military bullying, and openly supports the M23, the DRC has long hesitated to fully assert its fundamental right to self-defence, yet guaranteed by international law. This hesitation raises a central question: is the DRC naive, ill-advised, or strategically disarmed in this war that dare not speak its name?

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1. Rwanda Imposes an Assumed Strategy of Intimidation

For more than two decades, Rwanda has developed a regional strategy based on:

• indirect military provocation (proxy armed groups),
• diplomatic intimidation,
• and a discourse of moral domination over the DRC and its neighbours.[8]

Kigali speaks loudly, systematically accuses, implicitly threatens, and acts militarily whilst presenting itself as a victim.

This posture is typical of a state that practises power relations, convinced that the other side will hesitate to respond.

Faced with this strategy, the DRC has often adopted a defensive, cautious, even subdued attitude, which has reinforced the impression — false but dangerous — that it was not fully assuming the reality of the war being imposed upon it.

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2. Has the DRC Been Ignorant of This War?

The honest answer is uncomfortable: the DRC has not ignored the war, but it has long refused to name it clearly.

a) A Political Refusal to Assume the Word "Aggression"

Rather than speaking of external aggression, the DRC has often adopted the language of "security crisis", "internal armed conflict", or "M23 resurgence".

This lexical choice is not neutral.

Not naming the aggression means:

• legally weakening one's position,
• depriving oneself of full use of Article 51 of the UN Charter,
• and allowing the aggressor to impose their own narrative.

b) A Dangerous Illusion of Permanent Dialogue

The DRC has been trapped in a logic where:

• each attack is followed by a call for dialogue,
• each territory seized is followed by a ceasefire,
• each mediation freezes M23 gains.

This approach gives the impression that the DRC suffers events rather than strategically structuring them.

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3. M23 Supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya: An Uncomfortable Geopolitical Reality

The facts are now widely established:

• Rwanda supports the M23 militarily, logistically and politically.[9]
• Uganda plays an ambiguous role, oscillating between security cooperation with the DRC and strategic tolerance towards certain networks.[10]
• Kenya, as mediator and regional actor, has adopted a posture that has sometimes favoured an artificial equivalence between the Congolese state and armed groups, which has objectively benefited the M23.[11]

In this context, the DRC should have understood very early that it was facing an informal coalition, not simply a local rebellion.

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4. Why Didn't the DRC Use Its Right to Collective Defence as Under Kabila?

Under Joseph Kabila, despite numerous criticisms, the DRC had understood one essential thing: the country's security could not be left to the goodwill of hostile neighbours.

a) Under Kabila: Diversification of African Alliances

The DRC had:

• solicited Angola,
• closely cooperated with Zimbabwe,
• strengthened military ties with South Africa,
• and used SADC as a strategic framework.[12]

This approach was based on a clear principle: balancing regional power relations.

b) Under Current Governance: Excessive Dependence on Western Mediation

Today, the DRC has:

• prioritised external mediations,
• relied excessively on diplomatic processes,
• and hesitated to build a robust African coalition outside the EAC, yet dominated by countries with ambiguous interests.

This dependence has reduced Kinshasa's strategic room for manoeuvre.

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5. A Major Error: Not Legally Internationalising the War

The DRC should have:

• formally invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter,
• notified the Security Council of foreign armed aggression,
• explicitly requested multilateral African military assistance,
• and filed systematic legal complaints against Rwanda.

By not doing so firmly and repeatedly, the DRC has allowed Rwanda to:

• intimidate,
• threaten,
• and dictate the diplomatic tempo.

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6. Burundi: A Revealer of Regional Hypocrisy

Burundi, also a target of Rwanda's intimidating discourse, understood more quickly that it was threatened.

It has assumed:

• its security cooperation with the DRC,
• its clear reading of the danger,
• and its right to protect itself.[13]

The fact that the United States had to publicly recall that Burundian assistance to the DRC is legal shows how much the debate had been polluted by the Rwandan narrative.

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Conclusion: A Strategic Lesson for the DRC

The DRC is neither weak by nature nor without rights.

But it has too long:

• underestimated the systemic nature of aggression,
• hesitated to use its rights,
• and believed that restraint would be rewarded.

Faced with a neighbour that practises geopolitical bullying, restraint is not perceived as wisdom, but as weakness.

The DRC must now:

• clearly assume that it is in a situation of self-defence,
• build a credible African alliance outside biased frameworks,
• and speak the language of law, force and sovereignty.

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References

[1] United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council Meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/PV.9568, New York, 2024.

[2] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 51, San Francisco, 26 June 1945. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7

[3] United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2023/990, New York, 2023.

[4] United Nations Security Council, Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2024/432, New York, 2024.

[5] African Union and East African Community, Nairobi and Luanda Processes: Dialogue Framework for Peace in Eastern DRC, Monitoring Reports 2022-2024.

[6] Stearns, J. K., Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa, PublicAffairs, New York, 2011, pp. 312-345.

[7] Shaw, M. N., International Law, 8th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 1149-1162 (on the right to military assistance and collective self-defence).

[8] Reyntjens, F., Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 247-278.

[9] Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, Report, 2 September 2022. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/02/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes

[10] International Crisis Group, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed, Africa Briefing N°91, Nairobi/Brussels, 4 October 2012.

[11] African Union Peace and Security Council, Report on the Situation in Eastern DRC and Regional Mediation Efforts, PSC/PR/COMM.1167, Addis Ababa, 2024.

[12] Prunier, G., Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 285-312.

[13] International Crisis Group, Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term, Africa Report N°235, Nairobi/Brussels, 20 May 2015.

[14] Gray, C., International Law and the Use of Force, 4th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 198-224 (legal analysis of Article 51 of the UN Charter).

[15] Autesserre, S., The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.